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ABSTRACT 
 
 
WHAT DRIVES FIRMS TO DIVERSITY? 
 
By 
 
RONG GUO 
 
November 26, 2006 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Omesh Kini 
 
Major Department: Finance 
 
 
This paper examines whether corporate governance structures, serving as proxies for agency 
costs, can explain firms’ decision to diversify. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that firms 
with worse corporate governance structures are more likely to diversify. The extant literature 
usually compares the governance characteristics of multi-segment firms to those of single 
segment firms to address this issue. However, different governance characteristics may simply 
reflect differences in firm characteristics of diversified firms and focused firms. Furthermore, 
industry factors may affect both the propensity of firms to diversify and their governance 
characteristics. To separate out the agency costs explanation of firms’ decision to diversify, I 
compare the corporate governance structures of single segment firms that choose to diversify 
with those of a matched sample of single segment firms in the same industry that choose to 
remain focused. I find that firms with a higher percentage of outsiders on the board and smaller 
board size are more likely to diversify. These findings are inconsistent with the agency costs 
explanation of why firms choose to diversify. In addition, the CEO pay-to-performance 
sensitivity of diversifying firms is also not significantly different from that of firms that stay 
focused. The corporate governance characteristics cannot explain the changes in excess value 
around diversification either. Although some of the governance characteristics are significantly 
related to the announcement effects of diversifying mergers, these relations are often inconsistent 
with the agency cost explanation.  Taken together, my evidence indicates that diversifying firms 
do not systematically have worse governance structures than firms that stay focused and, 
therefore, higher agency costs do not appear to drive the decision to diversify.  
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What Drives Firms to Diversify?  
 
1. Introduction  
 
The conventional wisdom in the literature is that corporate diversification, on average, 
leads to a substantial reduction in firm value.1
 
An often cited reason for firms engaging in value 
destroying diversification activities is that they have higher agency costs, i.e., the managers of 
the firm attempt to capture private benefits such as lower employment risk and higher 
compensation even though diversification may destroy shareholders’ value. Consequently, firms 
with effective governance systems in place should not diversify. In this paper, I focus on whether 
higher agency costs can explain the decision by firms to diversify.  
A few studies in the literature attempt to relate agency costs to firms’ decision to 
diversify (Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997; Anderson et al., 2000). These studies usually compare 
one or several aspects of the corporate governance system ( CEO compensation, ownership 
structure, and board composition) of multi-segment firms and single segment firms, and find 
mixed evidence on whether higher agency costs prompt firms to diversify. Since there are 
systematic differences in firm characteristics between diversified firms and focused firms, firms 
that choose to diversify may have different corporate governance structures than diversified 
firms. For example, diversified firms may have a lower pay-to-performance sensitivity because 
the equity-based pay has some deficiency for these firms (Paul, 1992). Conceivably these firms 
may have had higher pay-to-performance sensitivity before they diversified. Since firms make 
the decision to change their diversification level before they diversify rather than after they 
                                                 
1 Consistent with this argument, Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) among others 
report that multi-segment firms trade at a discount relative to single segment firms. More recently, however, this 
evidence has been challenged. For example, Villalonga (2004) and Campa and Kedia (2002) document differences 
in characteristics between multi-segment firms and single segment firms, and find that the diversification discount 
disappears once self-selection is accounted for in the test design.  
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actually go through with these restructurings, the test design should compare the corporate 
governance structure of firms that choose to change their diversification levels with firms that do 
not at the time when they make the decision.  
Furthermore, Campa and Kedia (2002) find that industry factors are more important than 
firm characteristics in determining the decision to diversify. Additionally, Gillan, Hartzell, and 
Starks (2003) document that industry factors such as industry investment opportunities and 
average leverage can affect governance characteristics. It is, therefore, critical to control for 
industry effects before I compare the governance structure of diversifying firms and firms that 
remain focused. By comparing the corporate governance structures of single segment firms that 
diversify in the next year with those of firms that remain focused in the same industry, I derive 
more reliable conclusions as to whether agency costs affect firms’ decision to diversify.  
Some of the salient results from my analysis are as follows. Using a much larger sample 
than previous studies to compare the firm and governance characteristics of single segment firms 
and multiple segment firms, I find that diversified firms have larger board size, lower CEO 
ownership, blockholder ownership and insider ownership, and weaker pay-to-performance 
sensitivity than single segment firms. These results are consistent with agency costs explanation 
for diversification.  
As argued earlier, however, the more appropriate comparison of governance 
characteristics is between firms that choose to diversify with those that choose to remain focused. 
Furthermore, we are likely to arrive at incorrect conclusions if we also do not control for firm 
and industry characteristics too. With utilizing an industry-matched sample of similar single 
segment firms that choose not to diversify, my logistic regression analysis indicates that firms 
with more outsiders on board and smaller board size are more likely to diversify, which is 
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inconsistent with agency costs explanation of why firms choose to diversify. Additionally, I find 
that the CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity of diversifying firms is also not significantly 
different from that of firms that remain focused. These governance variables also cannot explain 
the changes in the excess value around diversification. Furthermore, the relation between 
governance characteristics and the announcement effects of diversifying mergers are mostly 
inconsistent with the agency costs explanation for diversification. Finally, I also compare firms 
that choose to refocus with firms that remain diversified and here too I do not find support for the 
agency costs hypothesis.  Overall, I find little support for the hypothesis that agency costs can 
explain firms’ decision to diversify. 
The key contribution of my paper is that it clearly illustrates that it is inappropriate to 
compare the governance characteristics of multiple segment firms with those of single segment 
firms in order to investigate whether agency costs prompt firms to diversify. More specifically, it 
may be the case that the governance characteristics of focused and diversified firms may differ 
systematically, but that certainly does not mean that we are illuminated on the question of 
whether agency costs prompt firms to diversify from single segment to multiple segment firms. 
Therefore, simply comparing the governance characteristics of diversified firms and focused 
firms may give us unreliable inferences as to what drives firms to diversify. Finding scant 
support for agency costs explanation for the decision to diversify is consistent with the notion 
that the decision to diversify is not synonymous with value destruction. By benchmarking 
correctly, I find little evidence in support of agency costs explanation. My paper fits in with 
recent research that questions the existence of a diversification discount.2 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), and Villalonga (2004).  
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of 
related literature and derives some testable implications. Section 3 describes the sample selection 
procedure and methodology. Section 4 provides a comparison of multiple segment firms and 
single segment firms. Section 5 presents results based on the comparison of diversifying firms 
with all firms that stay focused. Section 6 describes results where diversifying firms are 
compared with a matched sample of firms that remain focused. Section 7 displays the results on 
refocusing firms and matched firms that stay diversified. Section 8 provides a summary of my 
results and some concluding remarks.  
2. Prior Literature and Development of Hypotheses  
2.1. Why Firms Change Focus  
The extant literature refers to agency costs as an important explanation for firms’ 
decision to diversify. It is argued that the diversified firms have higher agency costs and 
managers choose to diversify to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders. Jensen (1986) 
argues that without significant ownership stakes, managers may pursue value-decreasing 
strategies to benefit themselves even though these strategies destroy shareholders’ value. 
Conglomerate merger is deemed as a good example of these value-decreasing strategies. He 
argues that firms with large free cash flows and low growth opportunities have higher agency 
costs of free cash flows. It follows that, other things being equal, firms that have higher free cash 
flows and lower growth opportunities are more likely to diversify.  
There are some empirical studies that have examined the association between the level of 
diversification and agency costs. Since the corporate governance system is the mechanism to 
control agency costs of the firm, many studies look at the relationship between diversification 
and different aspects of corporate governance systems. For example, Denis, Denis and Sarin 
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(1997) report that both insider ownership and outside blockholdings are higher in more focused 
firms and argue that lower agency costs are related to their lower level of diversification. 
Anderson et al. (2000) look at corporate governance variables and their relationships with the 
level of diversification. They find that CEOs of diversified firms tend to have lower equity 
holdings, higher levels of pay and lower sensitivity of pay to firm performance, which seems to 
be consistent with the agency costs explanation for diversification. However, they find that 
diversified firms tend to have more outside directors than firms that stay focused, which is 
inconsistent with the agency costs explanation. They also find that CEO turnover is no less 
sensitive to firm performance in diversified firms, which is not consistent with the view that 
managers in diversified firms are more entrenched than their counterparts in focused firms. They 
conclude that there is no compelling evidence that internal governance failures are associated 
with the decision to diversify.  
Another reason that firms choose to diversify is that diversification is the optimal strategy 
for them to support their future growth. If a firm grows above a level, it may divide its existing 
single segment into multiple segments for operational or managerial convenience. Or, the firm 
may think that acquiring a related or seemingly unrelated firm may be very helpful for its future 
growth because it solves problems related to its factor or product market, strengthens its research 
and development, expands its sales channel, or simply because it can form an internal capital 
market that can supply inexpensive capital more efficiently.  
2.2. Why New Benchmark  
As there are significant differences in the characteristics of diversified firms and focused 
firms, simply comparing the corporate governance structure of diversified firms and single 
segment firms can be misleading. Diversified firms and focused firms have different governance 
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structures due to reasons other than agency costs. For example, the observation that managers of 
diversified firms have higher levels of compensation may be due to their higher managerial 
expertise and ability. For example, Rose and Shepard (1997) suggest that managing a diversified 
firm is a more difficult task and requires broader capability and knowledge. Consistent with this 
argument, Berry, Bizjak, Lemmon, and Naveen (2002) find that CEOs of diversified firms are 
older, have a longer time working in the firm before assigned as CEO, and have higher education 
level (e.g., college degree, graduate degree, or the degree from a top-tier school) than the CEOs 
of focused firms. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2002) document evidence that diversified firms 
may have a greater need for outside board members for consulting purposes. Paul (1992) 
demonstrates that firms, such as diversified firms, that require CEOs to allocate the efforts across 
a broad set of activities, the equity-based compensation generally will not provide the proper 
incentives. These firms should use other corporate governance mechanisms to offset the 
deficiencies of the equity-based compensation. Schaefer (1998) documents evidence that pay-to-
performance sensitivity is inversely related to firm size.3 As a result, diversified firms will have 
lower pay-to-performance sensitivity as the CEOs of diversified firms need to allocate the effort 
across different segments and these firms tend to be larger than single segment firms.  
As the previous literature compares the corporate governance characteristics of multi-
segment firms and single segment firms, what they find may just reflect the systematic 
differences in characteristics of diversified firms and single segment firms. So, rather than 
simply use diversified firms’ governance structures as proxies for governance structures of those 
firms that choose to diversify, I compare the diversifying firms from single segment to multiple 
segments with those single segment firms that stay focused. Since they are all single-segment 
                                                 
3 Jensen and Murphy (1990) also find that CEOs of large firms tend to own fewer stocks and have lower pay-to-
performance sensitivity than CEOs of small firms. 
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firms, the differences in corporate governance structure should not be related to the systematic 
differences in firm characteristics for diversified firms and focused firms.  
Furthermore, it is also important to separate the influence of a firm’s industry on both its 
decision to diversify and its governance characteristics. Campa and Kedia (2002) find that while 
firm level characteristics are not very significant in explaining the diversification decision, the 
industry instruments can significantly explain the probability of diversification. In addition, 
Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) document that the governance structure is related to the 
industry factors such as investment opportunities, product uniqueness, competitive environment, 
leverage, and industry’s return volatility. Thus, industry factors affect both firms’ decision to 
diversify and their governance characteristics. To deal with this endogeneity problem, I match 
each diversifying firm with a firm that stays focused by SIC codes and firm size. Using an 
appropriate benchmark gives us a more accurate picture of whether higher agency costs motivate 
firms to diversify.4
 
 
2.3. Corporate Governance Characteristics and Firms’ Decision to Diversify  
2.3.1. CEO Compensation  
It has been argued that firms that pay their CEOs higher compensation tend to have 
higher agency costs. For example, according to Berle and Means (1932), CEOs can use their 
control over their boards to extract “excessive” levels of compensation. Core et al. (1999) find 
that firms with weaker governance structures tend to pay their CEOs more. In particular, they 
find that CEO pay goes up with the number of outsiders appointed by the CEO, the number of 
                                                 
4 Anderson et al. (2000) also look at the governance structure differences between those firms that stay focused (59 
firms in their sample) and those firms that diversify from singe segment firms to multiple segment firms (10 firms in 
their sample). They report a lower fractional ownership of CEO, a lower fractional ownership of blockholders, and a 
lower fraction of outside directors for those firms that diversified. However, neither these differences in governance 
structures nor differences in revenue-based excess value are significant. This may be due to their small sample size. 
My larger sample size increases the power of my tests relative to theirs and, therefore, increases the chance of 
finding significant differences in governance characteristics.  
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directors over age 69, board size, and the number of busy directors (proxied by the number of 
additional directorships held by a director).  
Performance-based compensation can provide the incentives for CEOs to take particular 
actions to increase the value of the firm (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). The pay-performance 
sensitivity represents the CEO’s share of the value created. The higher the sharing rate, the lower 
the agency costs should be. It follows that firms that have higher CEO pay-to-performance 
sensitivity should have lower agency costs. Therefore, if agency cost is the main reason that 
drives a firm to diversify, I expect a higher CEO compensation and a lower pay-to-performance 
sensitivity for firms that choose to diversify.  
2.3.2. Board Structure  
More outside board members should decrease agency costs and increase firm value. 
Fama (1980) argues that outsiders on the board of directors act as referees between shareholders 
and managers. Empirical evidence shows that more outsiders on the board seem to imply better 
governance. For example, Brickley and James (1987) document evidence that more outsiders on 
the board can decrease managerial consumption of perquisites in the banking industry. Weisbach 
(1988) finds the sensitivity of CEO turnovers to performance is greater when there is a majority 
of outsiders. Gillette, Noe, and Rebello (2003) use experiments to examine if the board can be 
designed to mitigate the interest conflict between insiders and owners. They find that a majority 
of outsiders on board can implement institutionally preferred policies even though these board 
members are uninformed. All these studies find evidence that more outsiders on boards can 
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effectively reduce agency costs. It follows that if agency costs drive firms to diversify, then we 
should expect that firms with more outsiders on board are less likely to diversify.5 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that firms with a majority of outsiders on board make 
better acquisitions.  Thus, firms with higher levels of monitoring that comes with a higher 
proportion of outsiders on the board will make more efficient diversifying decisions. I expect to 
find a positive relation between the changes in excess value around diversification events and the 
proportion of outsiders on the board. 
It has been argued that when boards get bigger, the boards become more symbolic and 
less a part of the management process, thus the agency problems are more severe. Yermack 
(1996) examines the relationship between the board size and Tobin’s q after controlling for other 
variables that are likely to affect Tobin’s q. He documents a significant negative relationship 
between board size and Tobin’s q. He also finds firms with smaller boards have a stronger 
relation between firm performance and CEO turnover than firms with larger boards. I, therefore, 
expect firms with larger board size are more likely to diversify after controlling for firm size.  
When the CEO also holds the position of the Chairman of board (duality), the board 
cannot effectively perform its key functions, including evaluating and firing CEOs. However, 
there are also costs of separating the CEO and Chairman positions such as the costs in 
monitoring the Chairman, costs of information sharing between CEO and the Chairman, and 
incentive costs related to the succession process in which the CEO is promised the Chairman title. 
Brickley et al. (1987) compare the performance of firms that separate the duties of the CEO and 
Chairman with those that combine them. They find that firms that combine the duties perform as 
                                                 
5 I define directors as insiders if they are officers of the firm and outsiders as non-officer directors. This officer-
director definition can also be found in other studies (see, for example, Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001). I obtain data 
on board composition from Compact Disclosure.  
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well as those that separate them. They also find that for the firms that separate the titles, most of 
their good performing CEOs are eventually granted both titles. Therefore, the evidence suggests 
that some firms use the title of Chairman as an incentive for new CEOs, and the difference in 
duality largely reflects the cross-sectional differences in the timing of CEO successions.  
Although separating the CEO and the Chairman of board does not affect future firm 
performance significantly, it does affect the sensitivity of CEO turnover to past firm performance. 
Goyal and Park (2002) find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is 
significantly lower when CEO is also the Chairman of the board. This implies that the board is 
less effective in removing poorly performing CEO when this CEO is also Chairman of the board. 
It follows that if the benefits of effective monitoring outweigh the costs, separating the position 
of CEO from the Chairman of board will be related to better governance and a lower probability 
that the firm will choose to diversify.  
2.3.4. Ownership Structure and Firm Value  
Firms with managers who have higher ownership stakes will be less likely to undertake 
activities that are in conflict with shareholder value maximization. It follows that if agency costs 
drive firms to diversify, higher CEO, insider, and director ownership stakes are all related to 
lower probability of firms’ decision to diversify. A higher institutional ownership and 
blockholder ownership are also related to lower probability of diversification, because with a 
higher ownership stake in the firm, institutions and blockholders have greater financial 
incentives to watch the CEO’s decision more attentively than otherwise.  
Given the above discussion, I hypothesize that by comparing the corporate governance 
structure of single-segment firms that choose to diversify and those that choose not to diversify, 
the diversifying firms will have higher CEO compensation, lower sensitivity of pay-to-
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performance, larger board size, smaller proportion of outsider board members and higher 
proportion of CEO also serve as the Chairman of the board, lower CEO, insider, and director 
ownership stakes, lower institutional ownership, lower blockholder ownership if agency costs 
motivate diversification activities.6  
3. Data and Sample Selection  
3.1. Sample Selection Procedure  
The sample consists of all firms with data reported on the Compustat Industry Segment 
database from 1992 to 2003 (excluding the year of 1997)7.
 
I follow the Berger and Ofek (1995) 
sample selection criteria and exclude observations where firms report segments in the financial 
sector (SIC 6000-6999), or sales less than $20 million, or the sum of segment sales deviated from 
total sales by more than one percent, or the market values of the firms are missing. Then I merge 
the data from Compustat Industry Segment database with Compustat ExecuComp database and 
Compact Disclosure database.  
The final sample consists of a total of 4,025 firm-year observations for multiple segment 
firms and 5,571 firm-year observations for single segment firms. I find that 229 of these firms 
choose to diversify. To construct my industry and size-matched sample, I match each 
diversifying firm with a firm that stays focused and has the same four-digit SIC code as the 
diversifying firm and with assets closest to that of the diversifying firm. I also require that this 
matching firm has to have assets within 10% of the assets of the diversifying firm.8 If I cannot 
                                                 
6 All these hypotheses are built on the assumption that diversification leads to value destruction. 
 
7 While I have collected data for 1997, I only report results for the sample period 1992-2003 (excluding 1997) since 
in 1998 changes in reporting requirement resulted in a large number of previously single segment firms reporting 
multiple segments. My results for the sample period 1992-2003 (including 1997) are, however, consistent with those 
reported in this paper.  
 
8 I conduct robustness tests by allowing the matched firm to have assets within 25% of the assets of the diversifying 
firm. By using this matching criteria, out of my 229 diversifying firms, 44 firms are matched at the four-digit SIC 
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identify any firm that stays focused within the same four-digit SIC code, then I match first at the 
three-digit, then at the two-digit, and if needed at one-digit SIC code level. If no one-digit SIC 
code match firm is found, I select the firm closest in assets to the diversifying firm. Out of my 
229 diversifying firms, 26 firms are matched by 4-digit SIC code, 15 are matched by 3-digit SIC 
code, 58 are matched by 2-digit SIC code, 98 are matched by 1-digit SIC code, and 32 are 
matched by assets only. At the end of my matching process, I have 229 diversifying firms and 
229 matching firms that choose not to diversify.  
3.2. Corporate Governance Variables  
I collect data on the size and composition of the board of directors, CEO duality, CEO 
ownership, director ownership, insider ownership, institutional ownership, and blockholder 
ownership from Compact Disclosure.  
The other corporate governance variables (like CEO compensation) are collected from 
the Compustat ExecuComp dataset. This study incorporates four CEO compensation measures. 
The first measure is the fixed portion of total compensation which is the sum of salary and bonus. 
The second compensation measure is the annual value of the total option portfolio. The third 
measure is the total compensation, which is the sum of the salary, bonus, and option value. The 
fourth measure is the equity-based pay, which is the ratio of the value of the CEO’s option 
portfolio to the total compensation.  
The sensitivity of CEO pay-to-performance is an important factor in corporate 
governance. Following the methodology of Jensen and Murphy (1990), I estimate the regression 
of the first difference of dollar compensation on the change in market value of equity, a multi-
segment (or diversifying) indicator equal to one for multi-segment (or diversifying) firms, and an 
                                                                                                                                                             
code level, 28 are matched at the three-digit SIC code level, 80 are matched at the two-digit SIC code level, 68 are 
matched at the one-digit SIC code level, and 9 are matched by assets only. My results using this matching approach 
are similar to those reported in the paper.  
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interactive term of the change in market value of equity and the multi-segment (or diversifying) 
indicator. The coefficient of the change in market value of equity captures the pay-to-
performance sensitivity of single-segment firms (or firms that stay focused), while the coefficient 
of the interaction between the change in market value of equity and the multi-segment (or 
diversifying) indicator represents the difference in the pay-to-performance sensitivity for multi-
segment firms (or diversifying firms) and single segment firms (or firms that stay focused). 
3.3. Methodology  
The primary objective of this paper is to show that it is inappropriate to compare the 
governance characteristics of multiple segment firms with those of single segment firms in order 
to investigate whether agency costs prompt firms to diversify. To demonstrate this point, I 
perform the same battery of tests using two samples. The first sample of firms includes all multi-
segment firms and single segment firms and the second sample includes firms that diversify from 
single segment firms to multi-segment firms next year and single segment firms that stay focused 
next year. This set of tests includes univariate comparisons of firm characteristics and 
governance characteristics of all single segment firms (single segment firms that remain focused 
next year) and multiple segment firms (single segment firms that diversify in the next year), 
comparison of the pay-to-performance sensitivity of all single segment firms (single segment 
firms that remain focused next year) and multiple segment firms (single segment firms that 
diversify in the next year), and estimation of logistic regressions to examine whether corporate 
governance characteristics affect firms’ decision to diversify. 
Since it is critical to control for firm size and industry effects, I first construct a size and 
industry matched sample of firms that stay focused next year prior to making the comparison 
between the governance structure of diversifying firms and firms that remain focused. In addition 
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to the above tests, I also use both OLS regression and Heckman’s model to investigate whether 
firms with stronger governance structure show an improvement in the excess value around 
diversification events.  Finally, I estimate the cumulative abnormal returns around diversifying 
mergers. I then estimate both OLS and Heckman’s regression models to examine whether firms 
with better governance characteristics experience a more positive market reaction to 
announcements of diversifying mergers.   
4. Results on Multiple Segment and Single Segment Firms 
4.1. Univariate Comparisons of Firm Characteristics and Governance Characteristics 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics on the excess value, number of segments, assets, 
sales, operating income-to-sales ratio (EBIT/SALES), net profit margin (NPM), capital 
expenditure-to-sales ratio (CAPX/SALES), capital expenditure-to-total assets ratio (CAPX/TA), 
total liabilities-to-assets ratio (LEVER), long-term debt-to-assets ratio (LTDLEVER), R&D-to-
sales ratio (R&D/SALES), free cash flow (FCF ), and Tobin’s q ratio (TOBINQ) for multiple 
segment firms and single segment firms.9, 10 There are 4,025 observations for multiple segment 
firms and 5,571 observations for single segment firms. Consistent with previous studies (see, for 
example, Anderson et al., 2000), I find that the diversified firms have lower excess value, larger 
size, higher leverage ratios, lower capital expenditure intensity, and a lower R&D intensity than 
the single-segment firms. The mean (median) excess value is 0.006 (-0.003) for diversified firms 
compared with 0.175 (0.132) of single segment firms. On average, the diversified firms have 
                                                 
9 Following Lehn and Poulsen (1989), I measure free cash flow as operating income before depreciation (Compustat 
item #13) minus total income taxes (Compustat item #16), change in deferred taxes from the previous year to the 
current year (change in Compustat item #35), interest expense (Compustat item #15), preferred dividends 
(Compustat item #19), and dividends on common stock (Compustat item #21); then I divide the total assets by this 
free cash flow to normalize this measure.  
 
10 I use the market-to-book ratio to compute the Tobin’s q, i.e., Compustat item (#6-#60+(#199*25)/#6, where #6 is 
the book value of assets, #60 is the book value of equity, #199 is the stock price at the fiscal year end, and #25 is the 
common shares outstanding. 
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three segments and focused firms have one segment. Both the median assets and sales of 
diversified firms are about twice the size of single segment firms. The mean (median) capital 
expenditure to sales ratio is 0.074 (0.046) for diversified firms, compared with 0.105 (0.053) for 
single segment firms. The mean (median) debt ratio is 0.462 (0.461) for diversified firms 
compared with 0.411 (0.403) for single segment firms. On average, the R&D-to-sales ratio of 
diversified firms is 1/3 to 1/2 that of single segment firms. The diversified firms also have 
significantly lower Tobin’s q than single segment firms with the mean (median) Tobin’s q for 
diversified firms equal to 1.367 (1.104), compared with 1.924 (1.439) for single segment firms. 
However, this does not imply that diversified firms have higher agency costs of free cash flow, 
because the diversified firms also have lower free cash flows than focused firms.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the corporate governance characteristics for the 
single segment firms and multiple segment firms. The salary and bonus of CEOs of diversified 
firms are significantly higher than those of CEOs of focused firms. The median salary and bonus 
for CEOs of diversified firms is $277,000 higher than that for CEOs of focused firms. The 
multiple segment firms have significantly lower CEO ownership, director ownership, insider 
ownership and blockholder ownership. For example, the CEOs of diversified firms have a mean 
(median) equity ownership of 4.91% (1.36%), compared with 5.92% (2.09 %) for CEOs of 
focused firms. Diversified firms also tend to have significantly larger boards, higher percentage 
of outsiders on board, more CEOs holding the position of Chair of the Board, and greater 
institutional ownership.  
4.2. Comparison of the Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity 
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Table 3 provides results comparing the sensitivity of CEO pay-to-performance for 
multiple segment and single segment firms11. I find that the coefficient of the interaction term of 
the multi-segment indicator and the market value of equity for all model specifications are 
negatively significant. This means that the salary and bonus, the value of option owned, and the 
total compensation of CEOs of multi-segment firms are less sensitive to performance than their 
counterparts in single segment firms. The magnitude of parameter estimates in column three 
implies that for each $1,000 change in shareholders’ wealth, the total compensation for CEOs of 
single-segment firms increases by $2.993, while the total compensation for CEOs of diversified 
firms increases by $0.983, with the difference of $2.010 being both statistically and 
economically significant. 
4.3. Logistic Regression on What Drives the Decision to be a Multi-Segment Firm 
Table 4 presents logistic regression results which model the likelihood that a firm is 
diversified as a function of governance variables. In these regressions, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has multiple segments; else it takes the 
value of zero. In all the reported models, I control for firm characteristics. Specifically, all model 
specifications contain the natural logarithm of firm size, operating profit margin, capital 
                                                 
11 I follow Core and Guay’s (2002) approximation method to compute the fiscal year-end value of the CEO’s option 
portfolio. Core and Guay (2002) also propose a method to compute the sensitivity of option value to the change in 
stock volatility (Vega), but their methodology can only be used to find the Vega of each CEO. The issue of interest 
in this paper is whether the Vega is different for diversifying firms and firms that stay focused. I follow Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) and Anderson et al. (2000) to compute the pay-to-performance sensitivity. They do not compute the 
pay-to-volatility sensitivity. However, similar to their method for finding pay-to-performance sensitivity, I calculate 
the pay-to-volatility sensitivity by estimating a regression of the change in CEO compensation on the change in the 
underlying stock volatility of the firm and the interactive term of the multi-segment dummy (diversifying dummy) 
and the volatility of the underlying stock. The coefficient of the change in stock volatility is the Vega and the 
coefficient of the interactive term captures the difference in Vega for multi-segment firms and single segment firms 
(diversifying firms and firms that stay focused). In all the model specifications comparing the Vega of multi-
segment firms and single segment firms as well as those comparing the Vega of diversifying firms and firms that 
stay focused, the coefficient associated with Vega is negative for CEO salary and bonus, but positive for the value of 
option portfolio and total compensation. There is no significant difference in Vega for multi-segment firms and 
single segment firms. Neither do any differences exist in Vega for diversifying firms and firms that stay focused. 
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expenditure intensity, leverage, and Tobin’s q as control variables. In all these specifications, 
firms that have a larger firm size, lower capital expenditure intensity, and lower Tobin’s q are 
more likely to be multi-segment firms.  
In the first model, I only include the compensation variables. I do not find any significant 
relationship between CEO compensation  and firms’ propensity to have multiple segments. In the 
second model, I only include board-related variables. In this model, I find that firms that have 
more outside directors on board, larger board size, and CEO duality are more likely to be multi-
segment firms. In the third model, I only include ownership variables. Here I find that firms that 
have lower CEO ownership, lower blockholder ownership, and higher institutional ownership are 
more likely to be multi-segment firms. In the last model, I include all these governance structure 
variables. In this model, I find that firms that have more outsiders on board, larger board size, 
duality, lower CEO ownership, and higher institutional ownership are more likely to be multi-
segment firms. 12  While the results related to board size and CEO ownership appear to be 
consistent with agency costs explanation, the results related to board composition and 
institutional ownership are inconsistent with this hypothesis. Nevertheless, as argued before, all 
that these regressions tell us is whether governance variables are related to the likelihood of 
firms to be diversified or not, and does not really address the issue of whether they have a 
bearing on the decision to diversify.  
5. Results on Diversifying Firms and All Firms that Stay Focused 
                                                 
12 I also include the G-index in the logistic regressions in addition to the other governance variables in Table 4. The 
corporate governance index (G-index) is constructed by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). It measures the number 
of takeover provisions adopted in corporate bylaws and it proxies for the level of shareholder rights. The index is 
constructed based on information from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) on 24 governance rules 
for approximately 1,500 firms. For every firm, one point is added for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. 
Therefore, a higher G-index implies weaker governance and a lower G-index is an indication of stronger governance. 
I find that the G-index is positively significant in all model specifications, implying that firms with poor protection 
of shareholder rights are more likely to be multi-segment firms. I do not include these results in the paper since the 
inclusion of the G-index appreciably reduces my sample size. 
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5.1. Univariate Comparisons of Firm Characteristics and Governance Characteristics 
Tables 5 and 6 display descriptive statistics on firm and governance characteristics for 
firms that choose to diversify and all the single segment firms that choose to remain focused. 
There are 229 observations for firms that diversify from single segment firms to multiple 
segment firms, whereas there are 4,948 observations for firms that choose to remain focused. I 
find that the diversifying firms have larger size, lower capital expenditure intensity, fewer 
growth opportunities, and spend less on R&D than the firms that stay focused. Both the assets 
and sales of the firms that choose to diversify are about 1.5 times the size of the firms that choose 
to stay focused. The significant differences in capital expenditure intensity, Tobin’s q and R&D 
ratio may reflect the differences in industry that diversifying firms and firms that stay focused 
are in, therefore, I need to control for industry effects on the decision to diversify and corporate 
governance before I can make reliable inferences. Firms that choose to diversify also have higher 
leverage ratios and lower free cash flows. The mean (median) debt ratio is 0.444 (0.452) for 
diversifying firms, which is much bigger than the 0.409 (0.397) for firms that stay focused. 
Firms with lower free cash flow and higher leverage may choose to diversify to utilize the 
internal capital markets of diversified firms. 
Table 6 presents summary statistics on corporate governance characteristics for single 
segment firms that choose to diversify in the next year and all the single segment firms that 
choose not to diversify in the next year. In Table 6, the blockholder ownership of firms that 
choose to diversify is significantly higher than that of firms that choose to remain focused. Both 
the t-statistic and z-statistic are significant at the 10 percent level. The firms that choose to 
diversify also have higher total direct pay (i.e., salary and bonus), larger board size, and lower 
insider ownership. However, only the z-statistics that compare the median of these variables are 
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significant, the t-statistics that compare the mean of the variables are not significant. The other 
governance characteristics are about the same for firms that choose to diversify and those that 
choose to remain focused. These observations are generally consistent with the agency costs 
explanation for why firms diversify. However, they are also consistent with the fact that 
diversifying firms usually are bigger, and bigger firms tend to have higher pay, larger board, and 
lower insider percentage ownership.  
5.2. Comparison of Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity 
The results comparing the sensitivity of CEO pay-to-performance between firms that 
choose to diversify and firms that choose to stay focused are presented in Table 7. In Table 7, the 
coefficient of the interactive term of the diversifying indicator and the market value of equity for 
the first model specification is significantly positive, and for the other two models is negative but 
insignificant. This means that while the salary and bonus of CEOs of diversifying firms are more 
sensitive to performance than those of firms that stay focused, the value of options owned by 
CEO and total compensation have similar sensitivity to firm performance.  
5.3. Logistic Regression on What Drives Firm to Diversify 
I address the issue of whether agency costs are related to firm’s decision to diversify in 
Tables 8 and 12. In Table 8, the firm-year observations include single segment firms that 
diversify in the next year and all single segment firms that continue to remain focused in the 
following year. In the last model, where I include all the governance variables, I find that both 
the proportion of insiders on the board and blockholder ownership are positively and 
significantly related to the probability that a firm will diversify. All other governance variables 
are not significant.  Regardless, these results could simply reflect the fact that the firm 
characteristics of firms that diversify are quite different from those that remain focused. In 
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addition, the industry composition of these two types of firms could be quite different and I 
could conceivably be picking up differences in governance characteristics across industries. 
Finally, the vastly different sample sizes for the two groups of firms could also make my 
inferences unreliable.  
 
6. Results on Diversifying Firms and Matched Firms that Remain Focused 
6.1. Univariate Comparisons of Firm Characteristics and Governance Characteristics 
Table 9 compares diversifying firms with a size-matched sample of firms that stay 
focused and operate in the same industry as the diversifying firms. Thus, this matched-sample 
approach yields 229 diversifying firms and 229 firms that stay focused. I find that in comparison 
to their peers in the same industry, diversifying firms have lower R&D expenditure and Tobin’s 
q ratio than firms that stay focused. The mean (median) Tobin’s q is 1.635 (1.256) for 
diversifying firms, while it is 1.921 (1.442) for firms that stay focused. However, only the t-
statistics of both variables are significant. There are no significant differences in the excess value, 
firm size, the profitability ratios, capital expenditures and leverage ratios for diversifying firms 
and firms that stay focused. This means that the differences in most of the above variables in 
Table 5 can be related to the differences in firm size and the industry factors of firms that are 
more likely to diversify and firms that are more likely to remain focused. 
Table 10 compares the governance characteristics for these two samples of firms. I find 
that only the median total direct pay and the mean option value granted in the current year are 
significantly different for diversifying firms and firms that stay focused. The mean option 
granted in the current year of the diversifying firms is about one half of firms that stay focused. 
The median option granted in the current year of the diversifying firms is about the same of firms 
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that stay focused and is not significant. It seems that diversifying firms tend to pay their CEOs in 
the form of direct pay rather than new option granted. 
 
6.2. Comparison of the Pay-to-Performance Sensitivity 
The results comparing the sensitivity of pay-to-performance between firms that choose to 
diversify and firms that choose to stay focused are presented in Table 11. In this table, the 
coefficients of the interactive term of the diversifying indicator and the market value of equity 
for all model specifications are insignificant. This means that the CEO pay-to-performance 
sensitivity in diversifying firms is not significantly lower than that in firms that stay focused.13 
6.3. Logistic Regression on What Drives Firm to Diversify 
As mentioned before, firm size and industry factors can affect both the firm’s governance 
characteristics and the firm’s propensity to diversify. To get around these issues, the sample in 
the logistic regressions reported in Table 12 includes the same set of single segment firms that 
diversify in the next year as in Table 8, but the sample of single segment firms that remain 
focused the following year is matched by firm size and industry. In the first three columns of this 
table, none of the governance variables are significant. In the last column of the table where all 
the governance variables are included, I find that both the percentage of insiders on board and 
                                                 
13  There are 1,753 firms that diversify from single segment firms to multi-segment firms. 155 of them have 
governance data available both before and after they diversify. On average, the number of segments increases from 
one segment to three segments after firms diversify. The mean (median) of CAPX/TA decreases from 0.067 (0.055) 
to 0.057 (0.047) around diversification. The mean (median) of BINS decreases from 0.329 (0.273) to 0.282 (0.250) 
around diversification. Other firm characteristics and governance characteristics do not change significantly around 
diversification. The pay-to-performance sensitivity increases significantly after diversification for the option 
portfolio that the CEO owns and the total CEO compensation; however, the pay-to-volatility sensitivity does not 
change significantly around diversification. I also examine the changes in corporate governance prior to the 
diversification decision. I do not find any significant changes in governance characteristics from two years before 
the firm makes the diversification decision (t-2) to one year before the firm makes the diversification decision (t-1) 
and from two years before the firm makes the diversification decision (t-2) to the year that the firm makes the 
diversification decision (t).  
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the board size are negatively related to the probability that a firm chooses to diversify. These 
results are inconsistent with the agency costs explanation of why firms choose to diversify.14 
6.4. Change in Excess Value around Diversification and Corporate Governance 
Characteristics 
 I examine the change in excess value around diversification and whether it is related to 
corporate governance characteristics in Table 13. Some firms have weaker governance structure 
and higher agency costs, and they may choose to diversify to benefit the CEO instead of the 
shareholders. Other firms have stronger governance structure and lower agency costs, and they 
may choose to diversify to increase the firm value (from good motivations). Therefore, I 
hypothesize that good corporate governance is positively related to the change in excess value 
around diversification. As shown in column one of table 13, none of the governance 
characteristics can explain the change in excess value around diversification.15 
6.5. Abnormal Returns around Diversification and Corporate Governance Characteristics 
 Next, I assume that the market is efficient and can distinguish between good 
diversification from bad diversification decisions. If firms choose to diversify for good reasons, 
the market will respond positively, and abnormal returns around the diversification event 
window will be positive for good diversification decisions and negative for bad diversification 
decisions.  
                                                 
14 I also include the G-index in addition to the other independent variables in the logistic regressions estimated in 
Table 8 and Table 12. In both tables, the G-index is always insignificant, meaning that weaker shareholder rights (or 
higher agency costs) cannot explain why firms choose to diversify. 
 
15 To check the robustness of my results, I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the excess value increases 
after diversification, and equals zero otherwise. Then I estimate a logistic regression with the governance variables 
as explanatory variables. Both equity-based pay and duality are negatively related to the probability that excess 
value increases after diversification, implying that firms that give their CEOs higher equity-based pay and have CEO 
duality are less likely to improve their excess value after diversification.  
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 To test this conjecture, I merge my sample of firms (1,753 firm-year observations) that 
diversify from single segment firms to multi-segment firms in the next year with the Compact 
Disclosure dataset and Compustat ExecuComp dataset, and get a smaller sample (229 firm-year 
observations) of diversifying firms that have all the governance data available. Then I merge this 
sample with the Worldwide M&A Section of the Securities Data Company (SDC) database to 
get the announcement date and effective date of all diversifying mergers and acquisitions. My 
final sample contains 204 firm-year observations. I compute the abnormal returns for the three 
fixed windows (-10, +1), (-1, +1) and (-5, +5) and one moving window (announcement data -5, 
effective date +5). The market model parameters are estimated using daily returns from -255 to -
51 relative to the merger announcement for this bidder and using the CRSP equally-weighted 
market return. I follow Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) to calculate the control variables. For 
example, OFFERSTOCK is a dummy variable that equals one if the offer is not cash only. In 
column one, the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the window 
(-10, +1). Only CAPX/SALES is negatively significant, implying that firms with higher capital 
expenditure intensity experience lower abnormal returns around the announcement of 
diversification event. The second column reports CARs for the window (0, +1). Only EBP is 
negatively and significantly related with the CARs at the 10 percent level. It seems that the 
market reacts more positively to the announcement of diversification event of firms that give 
their CEOs lower equity-based pay. The third column presents the results for the window (-5, 
+5). In addition to the total CEO compensation and equity-based pay, board size is also 
significant at the 10 percent level. The larger the board size, the lower the CARs. Finally, the 
results on the moving window (announcement date -5, effective date +5) are displayed in the 
fourth column. Here, only the board size is negatively and significantly related to the CARs.16 
                                                 
16 As a robustness check, I construct a dummy variable that equals one if the CAR is positive and zero otherwise. 
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Overall, the results for board size seem to be consistent with the agency costs explanation; 
however, the results on the total CEO compensation and equity-based pay are inconsistent with 
the agency cost theory.17 
7. Results on Refocusing Firms and Matched Firms that Remain Diversified 
I also compare the refocusing firms with a matched sample of firms that stay diversified. 
The matching criteria are similar to the one I use to identify the matched sample for diversifying 
firms (see page 13). As refocusing firms usually have fewer segments than firms that stay 
diversified, I also require the number of segments to be the same when finding the matching firm. 
I find that, compared to the matched sample of firms that stay diversified, refocusing firms have 
lower profitability (NPM), higher capital expenditure intensity (CAPX/TA), and lower R&D to 
sales ratio. The mean (median) NPM of refocusing firms is -0.018 (0.036), while the mean 
(median) NPM for the matched sample is 0.042 (0.048). The mean (median) CAPX/TA ratio of 
refocusing firms is 0.072 (0.051), in contrast, the mean (median) of the matched sample is 0.053 
(0.049). The mean R&D to sales ratio for refocusing firms is 0.044, while it is 0.027 for firms 
that stay diversified. It seems that firms that perform poorly and invest more in capital 
expenditure are more likely to adopt a refocusing strategy.  
With respect to corporate governance characteristics, the blockholder ownership of the 
refocusing firms is higher than that of firms that stay diversified; the mean (median) blockholder 
ownership of refocusing firms is 33.00% (28.39%), while the mean (median) of firms that stay 
                                                                                                                                                             
Both board size (in the last two columns) and institutional ownership (last column) are negatively and significantly 
related to the probability that a firm has a positive market reaction after the announcement of the diversifying 
mergers and acquisitions event. 
 
17 I also compute the Delta and Vega for each CEO using Core and Guay’s (2002) methodology and include them in 
the logistic regressions tests and the tests on the change in excess value around diversification events and 
announcement effects of diversifying mergers. The inclusion of these two variables does not change the main results 
of this paper. I also use Heckman’s two stage model to control for the possible selection bias in Table 13 and Table 
14. I choose not to report the results in the table because the inverse mills ratios in all the model specifications are 
insignificant and the results are basically the same as the OLS regressions. 
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diversified is 25.74% (22.69%). For the total direct compensation, there is no significant 
difference in the pay-to-performance sensitivity and the pay-to-volatility sensitivity for 
refocusing firms and firms that stay diversified. For the option portfolio the CEO owns and the 
total compensation (the sum of total direct compensation and the option portfolio of the CEO), 
refocusing firms have lower pay-to-performance sensitivity and higher pay-to-volatility 
sensitivity than the firms that stay diversified. If higher agency costs drive firms to diversify, it 
should be the firms with better governance structure that choose to refocus. The evidence from 
the comparison of governance characteristics of refocusing firms and firms that stay diversified 
do not support the agency costs theory.    
After refocusing events, the number of segments of refocusing firms decreases from two 
to one. The refocusing firms also improve their performance significantly after refocusing events. 
The mean (median) of the excess value increases from 0.003 (0.017) before they refocus to 0.160 
(0.160) after they refocus. There are no significant changes in other firm characteristics and 
governance characteristics. The pay-to-performance sensitivity and the pay-to-volatility 
sensitivity do not change either. Lower profitability (EBIT/SALES) and higher capital 
expenditure intensity (CAPX/SALES) are the only factors that predict firms’ probability to 
refocus. This is consistent with the findings from the univariate test that poorly performed firms 
may use refocusing as one way to improve their performance. However, agency costs theory 
cannot explain why firms choose to refocus. The changes in excess value around refocusing 
events are not related to any of the firm characteristics or governance characteristics.18  
8. Conclusions  
                                                 
18 When I include the G-index in the regressions, I find that it is negatively related to the change in excess value. 
This means that the lower the G-index, which represents stronger shareholder rights, the better the improvements in 
excess value after refocusing events.  
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Agency costs are often cited as a reason for firms’ decision to diversify. However, most 
of the literature simply compares one or several aspects of the corporate governance structure of 
diversified and focused firms. In this paper, I examine this issue by looking at the governance 
characteristics before firms diversify. By comparing single segment firms that diversify in the 
next year with those that stay focused, my results are not affected by systematic differences in 
the characteristics of diversified firms and focused firms. Previous studies show that industry 
factors affect both firms’ decision to diversify and the corporate governance characteristics of 
firms. I separate the agency costs explanation from these industry factors by using a size-
matched sample of firms that stay focused and operate in the same industry as the diversifying 
firms.  
My empirical analysis indicates that firms with more outsiders on board and smaller 
board size are more likely to diversify, which is inconsistent with the agency costs explanation of 
why firms choose to diversify. Furthermore, I find that the CEO pay-to-performance sensitivity 
in diversifying firms is also not significantly different from that for CEOs in firms that remain 
focused. The governance characteristics cannot explain why firms choose to diversify and are not 
related to the changes in excess value around diversification. Furthermore, though some 
governance characteristics are related to the cumulative abnormal returns around diversification 
events, these relationships are often inconsistent with the agency costs theory. In sum, I find little 
support for the hypothesis that agency costs can explain firms’ decision to diversify. Finally, my 
results for firms that choose to refocus are also inconsistent with the agency costs hypothesis. 
The main contribution of my paper is that it clearly illustrates the pitfalls in comparing 
the governance characteristics of multiple segment firms with those of single segment firms in 
order to investigate whether agency costs prompt firms to diversify. More specifically, even if 
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governance characteristics are related to the probability of firms being diversified, this relation 
does not shed any light on the question of whether agency costs prompt firms to diversify from 
single segment to multiple segment firms. Therefore, simply comparing the governance 
characteristics of diversified firms and focused firms may give us unreliable inferences on what 
drives firms to diversify. By using more appropriate benchmarks, I find little evidence to support 
agency costs explanation for the diversification decision. These results are consistent with recent 
research that questions the very existence of a diversification discount.19 Finding scant support 
for agency costs explanation for the decision to diversify is consistent with the notion that the 
decision to diversify is not synonymous with value destruction.  
 
 
 
                                                 
19 See, for example, Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002), and Villalonga (2004). 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics for Multiple Segment Firms and Single Segment Firms  
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the multiple segment firms and single segment firms. EXVAL is the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual 
value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the 
segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NUMSEG is the number of business segments in which a firm operates as 
a measure of firm diversification. ASSETS is the book value of total assets. SALES is the book value of total sales. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of 
EBIT to total sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of 
capital expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales, FCF is computed following Lehn and Pousen (1989), and TOBINQ is the market to 
book ratio of the firm. The table includes 9,596 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 5,571 of them are single segment firms. The 
remaining 4,025 are multiple segment firms.  
 
Multiple Segment Firms (N=4,025) Single Segment Firms (N=5,571) Difference (Multiple – Single) Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL 0.006 -0.003 0.548 0.175 0.132 0.549 -14.88a -14.69a 
NUMSEG 3.025 3.000 1.120 1.000 1.000 0.000 114.78a 93.81a 
ASSETS ($ m.) 4362.060 1590.560 8602.470 2215.880 644.316 5079.560 14.15a 28.04a 
SALES ($ m.) 4091.190 1577.090 10162.910 2172.840 649.558 5045.840 11.03a 27.66a 
EBIT/SALES 0.093 0.093 0.107 0.088 0.097 0.234 1.18 -3.86a 
NPM 0.028 0.043 0.178 0.008 0.051 0.610 2.30b -7.17a 
CAPX/SALES 0.074 0.046 0.097 0.105 0.053 0.171 -11.04a -7.15a 
CAPX/TA 0.059 0.049 0.046 0.077 0.058 0.067 -15.39a -11.35a 
LEVER 0.462 0.461 0.173 0.411 0.403 0.202 13.10a 16.06a 
LTDLEVER 0.225 0.223 0.151 0.183 0.148 0.183 12.31a 16.27a 
R&D/SALES 0.023 0.000 0.060 0.056 0.000 0.150 -14.98a -3.20a 
FCF 0.082 0.075 0.192 0.091 0.092 0.119 -2.59a -13.48a 
TOBINQ 1.367 1.104 0.900 1.924 1.439 1.573 -21.90a -20.70a 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 2  
Summary Statistics of Governance Characteristics for the Single Segment and Multiple Segment Firms 
  
This table displays summary statistics of the governance characteristics for firms split by multiple segment firms and single segment firms. TCC, 
BLK_VALUE, SHROWN, and SOPTVAL are from the Compustat ExecuComp dataset. TCC is the total of SALARY and BONUS; BLK_VALUE is 
the Black-Scholes value of options granted; OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of options portfolio owned by the CEO; SHROWN is the dollar 
amount of company stock owned by CEO, SOPTVAL is the dollar value of the options granted as valued by company; EBP is the ratio of 
OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER_SUM, INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, BLOCKOWNPC, 
INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. INSIDER_SUM is the number of insiders on board; INSIDER is the 
percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair of the Board; and CEOOWNPC , INSTOWNPC, 
BLOCKOWNPC, INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are percentage ownership by CEO, institutions, blockholders, insiders, and directors, respectively. 
The table includes 9,596 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 5,571 of these belong to single segment firms and the remaining 4,025 
belong to multiple segment firms. The difference in mean (median) is conducted using a t-test (Wilcoxon two-sample z-test).  
 
Multiple Segment Firms (N=4,025) Single Segment Firms (N=5,571) Difference (Multiple – Single) Year 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median 
TCC ($000) 1201.500 954.395 944.534 916.205 678.667 1024.590 14.09a 21.97a 
BLK_VALUE ($) 1764.240 511.514 5448.290 1971.720 410.087 11481.710 -1.18 3.78a 
OPTPORT ($000) 13052.670 4333.310 39304.730 13449.140 3985.940 40170.410 -0.48 3.12a 
EBP 0.714 0.816 0.278 0.714 0.845 0.310 0.08 -5.97a 
SHROWN 1332.830 170.447 7391.750 1877.170 225.190 8863.920 -3.24a -5.48a 
CEOOWNPC (%) 4.912 1.360 8.216 5.921 2.090 9.062 -3.97a -6.30a 
SOPTVAL ($) 2083.930 657.827 5160.900 2049.570 480.568 10531.480 0.21 6.18a 
INSIDER_SUM 2.221 2.000 1.421 2.245 2.000 1.326 -0.81 -2.66a 
INSIDER 0.247 0.200 0.179 0.294 0.250 0.189 -12.41a -16.23a 
BOARDSIZE 9.829 10.000 3.157 8.425 8.000 3.140 21.57a 23.75a 
DUAL 0.713 1.000 0.452 0.634 1.000 0.482 8.06a 7.95a 
INSTOWNPC (%) 61.174 63.260 19.928 58.701 61.240 22.459 5.66a 4.70a 
BLOCKOWNPC (%) 29.284 26.235 23.076 33.315 30.430 24.929 -8.12a -7.65a 
INSOWNPC (%) 7.068 2.050 12.534 12.369 5.275 16.926 -17.51a -19.65a 
DIROWNPC (%) 0.021 0.004 0.058 0.128 0.008 6.417 -1.20 -15.07a 
a:Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;.  c:Significant at 10% level 
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Table 3  
OLS Regression Comparing the Sensitivity of Compensation to Firm Performance in Multiple 
Segment Firms and Single Segment Firms  
 
This table compares the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance in multiple segment firms and 
single segment firms. The first difference in salary and bonus is the annual change of CEO salary and 
bonus expressed in 1992 dollars. The first difference in value of options is the annual change of Black-
Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The first difference in 
total compensation is the annual change of CEO salary, bonus, and Black-Scholes value of option 
portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The independent variables include a dummy equal 
to one for multi-segment firms, the first difference in the market value of equity, the first difference in the 
volatility of the underlying stock, an interactive term between the dummy and the first difference of 
market value of equity, and an interactive term between the dummy and the first difference in the 
volatility of the underlying stock. The sample consists of 9,596 firm year observations from 1992-2003. 
4,025 of these belong to multi-segment firms, and 5,571 of these belong to single segment firms.  
 
First Difference in 
Salary and Bonus 
First Difference in 
Value of Options 
First Difference in 
Total Compensation Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
-299.522a 
(-5.21) 
-66.825 
(-0.03) 
-366.347 
(-0.19) 
Multi-segment Indicator 
-6.724 
(-0.29) 
-545.060 
(-0.70) 
-551.784 
(0.71) 
LSIZE 
42.704a 
(5.21) 
53.452 
(0.19) 
96.157 
(0.35) 
First Difference in Market Value 
of Equity 
0.052a 
(20.19) 
2.942a 
(34.23) 
2.993a 
(34.86) 
First Difference in Market Value 
of Equity Interacted with Multi-
segment Indicator 
-0.028a 
(-9.07) 
-1.982a 
(-19.21) 
-2.010a 
(-19.49) 
First Difference in Volatility 
-546.626a 
(-5.03) 
11152a 
(3.07) 
10605a 
(2.92) 
First Difference in Volatility 
Interacted with Multi-segment 
Indicator 
-40.826 
(-0.22) 
880.198 
(0.14) 
839.372 
(0.14) 
R2 0.102 0.179 0.185 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 4  
Logistic Regressions of Firms being a Multi-segment Firm 
  
This table contains results from the logistic regression of firms being a multiple segment firm on the corporate 
governance characteristics. The table includes 9,566 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 5,571 of these 
belong to single segment firms and the remaining 4,025 belong to multiple segment firms. The dependent variable 
equals to one if the firm is a diversified firm. LSIZE is the logarithm of book value of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the 
ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, and LEVER is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, TOBINQ is the market to book ratio of the firm, TCC is from the Compustat ExecuComp 
dataset. OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO. LTOTAL is the natural 
logarithm of TCC, and OPTPORT. EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER, 
BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, and BLOCKOWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. 
INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair 
of the Board; and CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC and BLOCKOWNPC are percentage ownership by CEOs, institutions 
and blockholders, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
-2.394a 
(0.00) 
-2.345a 
(0.00) 
-2.278a 
(0.00) 
-2.209a 
(0.00) 
LSIZE 
0.411a 
(0.00) 
0.329a 
(0.00) 
0.348a 
(0.00) 
0.278a 
(0.00) 
EBIT/SALES 
0.167 
(0.27) 
0.110 
(0.45) 
0.248 
(0.20) 
0.209 
(0.26) 
CAPX/SALES 
-2.572a 
(0.00) 
-2.553a 
(0.00) 
-3.161a 
(0.00) 
-3.111a 
(0.00) 
LEVER 
0.203 
(0.11) 
0.207 
(0.11) 
0.500a 
(0.00) 
0.459a 
(0.00) 
TOBINQ 
-0.364a 
(0.00) 
-0.350a 
(0.00) 
-0.400a 
(0.00) 
-0.390a 
(0.00) 
LTOTAL 
-0.030 
(0.35)   
0.002 
(0.97) 
EBP 
0.200 
(0.14)   
-0.111 
(0.54) 
INSIDER  
-0.561a 
(0.00)  
-0.611a 
(0.00) 
BOARDSIZE  
0.047a 
(0.00)  
0.047a 
(0.00) 
DUAL  
0.168a 
(0.00)  
0.213a 
(0.00) 
CEOOWNPC   
-1.652a 
(0.00)  
-1.425b 
(0.02) 
INSTOWNPC   
0.005a 
(0.00) 
0.005a 
(0.00) 
BLOCKOWNPC   
-0.002c 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(0.19) 
CHI-SQUARE 
977.338 
(0.00) 
990.970 
(0.00) 
646.576 
(0.00) 
686.986 
(0.00) 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for the Firms that Choose to Diversify and for All Firms that Choose to Remain Focused  
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the firms that choose to diversity and all firms that choose to remain focused. EXVAL is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NUMSEG is the number of business 
segments in which a firm operates as a measure of firm diversification. ASSETS is the book value of total assets. SALES is the book value of total 
sales. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets, R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales, FCF is computed following Lehn and Pousen (1989), and 
TOBINQ is the market to book ratio of the firm.  The table includes 5,177 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of these belong to 
diversifying firms, and the remaining 4,948 belong to all firms that choose to stay focused.  
 
Diversify (N=229) Stay Focus (N=4,948) Difference (Diversify – Stay Focus) Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL 0.169 0.083 0.564 0.183 0.143 0.544 -0.37 -0.50 
ASSETS ($ m.) 2815.200 919.349 5501.140 2236.710 645.990 5111.940 1.67c 3.63a 
SALES ($ m.) 2999.110 925.070 7432.650 2206.350 648.897 5048.230 1.60 3.41a 
EBIT/SALES 0.096 0.098 0.127 0.092 0.098 0.233 0.46 -0.48 
NPM 0.021 0.048 0.158 0.012 0.052 0.633 0.59 -1.92c 
CAPX/SALES 0.087 0.051 0.133 0.106 0.054 0.173 -2.07b -0.96 
CAPX/TA 0.067 0.053 0.051 0.079 0.059 0.068 -3.37a -2.12b 
LEVER 0.444 0.452 0.185 0.409 0.397 0.202 2.61a 3.56a 
LTDLEVER 0.208 0.215 0.166 0.182 0.146 0.184 2.07b 2.90a 
R&D/SALES 0.033 0.000 0.101 0.054 0.000 0.142 -2.96a -1.77c 
FCF 0.084 0.087 0.067 0.094 0.093 0.118 -1.97c -2.12b 
TOBINQ 1.635 1.256 1.121 1.934 1.455 1.578 -3.86a -3.06a 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6  
Summary Statistics of Governance Characteristics for the Firms that Choose to Diversify and for All Firms that Choose to 
Remain Focused  
 
This table displays summary statistics of the governance characteristics for firms split by diversifying firms and all firms that stay focused. TCC, BLK_VALUE, 
SHROWN, and SOPTVAL are from the Compustat ExecuComp dataset. TCC is the total of SALARY and BONUS; BLK_VALUE is the Black-Scholes value of 
options granted; OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of options portfolio owned by the CEO; SHROWN is the dollar amount of company stock owned by CEO, 
SOPTVAL is the dollar value of the options granted as valued by company; EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER_SUM, 
INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, BLOCKOWNPC, INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. 
INSIDER_SUM is the number of insiders on board; INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the 
Chair of the Board; and CEOOWNPC , INSTOWNPC, BLOCKOWNPC, INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are percentage ownership by CEO, institutions, 
blockholders, insiders, and directors, respectively. The difference in mean (median) is conducted using a t-test (Wilcoxon two-sample z-test). The table includes 
5,177 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of these belong to diversifying firms, and the remaining 4,948 belong to all firms that stay focused. 
The difference in mean (median) is conducted using a t-test (Wilcoxon two-sample z-test).  
 
Diversify (N=229) Stay Focus (N=4948) Difference (Diversify – Stay 
Focus) Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
TCC ($000) 1200.090 800.000 2984.380 907.241 679.793 839.941 1.48 3.38a 
BLK_VALUE ($) 1466.610 399.177 3738.240 2003.960 396.522 12102.710 -1.78 -0.85 
OPTPORT ($000) 15194.160 3459.740 48950.570 13469.040 4010.790 40433.230 0.53 -0.49 
EBP 0.698 0.816 0.310 0.713 0.845 0.312 -0.71 -1.46 
SHROWN 2846.490 191.683 20810.540 1842.870 229.425 8026.960 0.72   -0.54 
CEOOWNPC (%) 6.483 1.980 8.994 5.960 2.100 9.086 0.61 0.28 
SOPTVAL ($) 1548.220 431.601 3510.460 2091.790 478.306 11109.430 -1.93c -0.88 
INSIDER_SUM 2.310 2.000 1.272 2.256 2.000 1.333 0.60 0.82 
INSIDER 0.313 0.250 0.228 0.295 0.250 0.189 1.19 -0.07 
BOARDSIZE 8.786 9.000 3.472 8.448 8.000 3.145 1.44 2.12b 
DUAL 0.662 1.000 0.474 0.636 1.000 0.481 0.80 0.80 
INSTOWNPC (%) 58.581 60.310 21.580 58.908 61.600 22.422 -0.21 -0.33 
BLOCKOWNPC (%) 36.148 31.410 25.059 32.911 30.060 24.899 1.91c 1.84c 
INSOWNPC (%) 11.087 3.970 17.565 12.254 5.350 16.652 -1.03 -2.07b 
DIROWNPC (%) 0.043 0.006 0.092 0.139 0.008 6.801 -0.96 -0.86 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7  
OLS Regression Comparing the Sensitivity of Compensation to Firm Performance in Diversifying 
Firms and All Firms that Remain Focused  
 
This table compares the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance in diversifying firms and all 
firms that choose to stay focused. The first difference in salary and bonus is the annual change of CEO 
salary and bonus expressed in 1992 dollars. The first difference in value of options is the annual change 
of Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The first 
difference in total compensation is the annual change of CEO salary, bonus, and Black-Scholes value of 
option portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The independent variables include a 
dummy equal to one for diversifying firms, the first difference in the market value of equity, the first 
difference in the volatility of the underlying stock, an interactive term between the dummy and the first 
difference of market value of equity, and an interactive term between the dummy and the first difference 
in the volatility of the underlying stock. The sample consists of 5,177 firm year observations from 1992-
2003. 229 of these belong to diversifying firms, and 4,948 of these belong to all firms that stay focused.  
 
First Difference in 
Salary and Bonus 
First Difference in 
Value of Options 
First Difference in 
Total Compensation Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
-294.231a 
(-3.79) 
2204.127 
(0.71) 
1909.896 
(0.62) 
Diversifying  Indicator 
308.822a 
(4.10) 
-6738.766b 
(-2.24) 
-6429.944b 
(-2.14) 
LSIZE 
39.805a 
(3.54) 
-241.456 
(-0.54) 
-201.652 
(-0.45) 
First Difference in Market 
Value of Equity 
0.045a 
(15.79) 
3.340a 
(29.08) 
3.385a 
(29.56) 
First Difference in Market 
Value of Equity Interacted 
with Diversifying Dummy 
0.027a 
(2.86) 
-0.499 
(-1.30) 
-0.471 
(-1.23) 
First Difference in Volatility 
-482.289a 
(-4.26) 
12714a 
(2.81) 
12232a 
(2.71) 
First Difference in Volatility 
Interacted with Multi-segment 
Indicator 
-1138.900 
(-1.31) 
-33867 
(-0.98) 
-35006 
(-1.01) 
R2 0.109 0.207 0.213 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 8 
Logistic Regressions of Firms that Choose to Diversify (Full Sample) 
 
This table contains results from the logistic regression of firms that choose to diversify on the corporate governance 
characteristics. The table includes 5,177 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of these belong to 
diversifying firms, and the remaining 4,948 belong to all firms that choose to stay focused. The dependent variable 
equals to one if the firm is a diversified firm. LSIZE is the logarithm of book value of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the 
ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, and LEVER is the ratio of 
total debt to total assets, TOBINQ is the market to book ratio of the firm, TCC is from the Compustat ExecuComp 
dataset. OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO. LTOTAL is the natural 
logarithm of TCC, and OPTPORT. EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER, 
BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, and BLOCKOWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. 
INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair 
of the Board; and CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC and BLOCKOWNPC are percentage ownership by CEOs, institutions 
and blockholders, respectively.  
 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 
-4.099a 
(0.00) 
-4.070a 
(0.00) 
-4.036a 
(0.00) 
-4.794a 
(0.00) 
LSIZE 
0.084 
(0.19) 
0.129b 
(0.02) 
0.173a 
(0.00) 
0.121 
(0.18) 
EBIT/SALES 
0.151 
(0.72) 
0.157 
(0.70) 
0.159 
(0.73) 
0.082 
(0.84) 
CAPX/SALES 
-0.962c 
(0.08) 
-1.060c 
(0.06) 
-1.080 
(0.11) 
-1.131 
(0.10) 
LEVER 
0.466 
(0.19) 
0.353 
(0.34) 
0.325 
(0.47) 
0.277 
(0.55) 
TOBINQ 
-0.182a 
(0.00) 
-0.139b 
(0.02) 
-0.165b 
(0.03) 
-0.182b 
(0.03) 
LTOTAL 
0.118 
(0.23)   
0.065 
(0.61) 
EBP 
-0.472 
(0.25)   
-0.111 
(0.83) 
INSIDER  
0.640c 
(0.09)  
0.804c 
(0.09) 
BOARDSIZE  
0.011 
(0.68)  
0.032 
(0.27) 
DUAL  
0.091 
(0.54)  
0.241 
(0.19) 
CEOOWNPC   
0.178 
(0.65) 
0.153 
(0.73) 
INSTOWNPC   
-0.005 
(0.21) 
-0.005 
(0.28) 
BLOCKOWNPC   
0.011a 
(0.00) 
0.011a 
(0.00) 
CHI-SQUARE 
23.998 
(0.00) 
24.604 
(0.00) 
29.565 
(0.00) 
33.314 
(0.00) 
 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 9 
Summary Statistics for the Firms that Choose to Diversify and for Matched Firms that Choose to Remain Focused  
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the firms that choose to diversity and matched firms that choose to remain focused. EXVAL is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NUMSEG is the number of business 
segments in which a firm operates as a measure of firm diversification. ASSETS is the book value of total assets. SALES is the book value of total 
sales. EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-
term debt to total assets, R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales, FCF is computed following Lehn and Pousen (1989), and 
TOBINQ is the market to book ratio of the firm. The table includes 458 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of these belong to 
diversifying firms, and the remaining 229 belong to matched firms that stay focused.  
 
 
Diversify (N=229) Stay Focus (N=229) Difference (Diversify – Stay Focus) Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL 0.169 0.083 0.564 0.113 0.109 0.560 1.06 -0.71 
ASSETS ($ m.) 2815.200 919.349 5501.140 2710.900 941.200 4986.280 0.21 0.01 
SALES ($ m.) 2999.110 925.070 7432.650 2500.160 933.982 3813.950 0.90 0.12 
EBIT/SALES 0.096 0.098 0.127 0.091 0.098 0.189 0.36 0.23 
NPM 0.021 0.048 0.158 0.008 0.050 0.322 0.53 0.65 
CAPX/SALES 0.087 0.051 0.133 0.102 0.050 0.176 -1.01 -0.14 
CAPX/TA 0.067 0.053 0.051 0.073 0.049 0.065 -1.10 -0.04 
LEVER 0.444 0.452 0.185 0.426 0.427 0.190 1.04 -0.97 
LTDLEVER 0.208 0.215 0.166 0.196 0.165 0.170 0.74 -0.74 
R&D/SALES 0.033 0.000 0.101 0.063 0.000 0.170 -2.28b 1.20 
FCF 0.084 0.087 0.067 0.090 0.087 0.131 -0.61 -0.62 
TOBINQ 1.635 1.256 1.121 1.921 1.442 1.675 -2.15b 1.52 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 10  
Summary Statistics of Governance Characteristics for the Firms that Choose to Diversify and for the Matched Firms that 
Choose to Remain Focused  
This table displays summary statistics of the governance characteristics for firms split by diversifying firms and matched firms that stay focused. TCC, 
BLK_VALUE, SHROWN, and SOPTVAL are from the Compustat ExecuComp dataset. TCC is the total of SALARY and BONUS; BLK_VALUE is the Black-
Scholes value of options granted; OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of options portfolio owned by the CEO; SHROWN is the dollar amount of company 
stock owned by CEO, SOPTVAL is the dollar value of the options granted as valued by company; EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and 
OPTPORT. INSIDER_SUM, INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, BLOCKOWNPC, INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are from the 
Compact Disclosure dataset. INSIDER_SUM is the number of insiders on board; INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; 
DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair of the Board; and CEOOWNPC , INSTOWNPC, BLOCKOWNPC, INSOWNPC, and DIROWNPC are percentage ownership 
by CEO, institutions, blockholders, insiders, and directors, respectively. The table includes 458 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of these 
belong to diversifying firms, and the remaining 229 belong to matched firms that stay focused. The difference in mean (median) is conducted using a t-test 
(Wilcoxon two-sample z-test).  
Diversify (N=229) Stay Focus (N=229) Difference (Diversify – Stay 
Focus) Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
TCC ($000) 1200.090 800.000 2984.380 931.692 725.400 771.553 1.32 1.71c 
BLK_VALUE ($) 1466.610 399.177 3738.240 2692.780 447.644 6691.650 -2.42b 1.58 
OPTPORT ($000) 15194.160 3459.740 48950.570 17201.840 4568.990 40574.240 -0.48 1.09 
EBP 0.698 0.816 0.310 0.717 0.854 0.312 -0.66 -1.64 
SHROWN 2846.490 191.683 20810.540 2705.260 346.435 8194.770 0.10 1.53 
CEOOWNPC 6.483 1.980 8.994 6.953 2.800 9.039 -0.40 -1.03 
SOPTVAL ($) 1548.220 431.601 3510.460 2501.720 559.393 5578.110 -2.18b -1.49 
INSIDER_SUM 2.310 2.000 1.272 2.507 2.000 1.369 -1.59 1.46 
INSIDER 0.313 0.250 0.228 0.310 0.273 0.191 0.14 -1.01 
BOARDSIZE 8.786 9.000 3.472 9.135 9.000 3.349 -1.10 0.88 
DUAL 0.662 1.000 0.474 0.670 1.000 0.471 -0.17 0.17 
INSTOWNPC (%) 58.581 60.310 21.580 59.794 63.290 21.208 -0.60 -0.70 
BLOCKOWNPC (%) 36.148 31.410 25.059 36.739 32.960 25.035 -0.25 -0.31 
INSOWNPC (%) 11.087 3.970 17.565 12.011 4.980 16.395 -0.58 -0.96 
DIROWNPC  0.043 0.006 0.092 0.038 0.007 0.075 0.63 -0.24 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 11 
OLS Regression Comparing the Sensitivity of Compensation to Firm Performance in Diversifying 
Firms and Matched Firms that Remain Focused  
 
This table compares the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance in diversifying firms and 
matched firms that choose to stay focused. The first difference in salary and bonus is the annual change of 
CEO salary and bonus expressed in 1992 dollars. The first difference in value of options is the annual 
change of Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The first 
difference in total compensation is the annual change of CEO salary, bonus, and Black-Scholes value of 
option portfolio owned by the CEO expressed in 1992 dollars. The independent variables include a 
dummy equal to one for diversifying firms, the first difference in the market value of equity, the first 
difference in the volatility of the underlying stock, an interactive term between the dummy and the first 
difference of market value of equity, and an interactive term between the dummy and the first difference 
in the volatility of the underlying stock. The sample consists of 458 firm year observations from 1992-
2003. 229 of these belong to diversifying firms, and 229 of these belong to matched firms that stay 
focused and operate in the same industry and about similar size of the diversifying firms.  
  
First Difference in 
Salary and Bonus 
First Difference in 
Value of Options 
First Difference in 
Total Compensation Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 
-1110.174c 
(-1.68) 
38333b 
(2.37) 
37223b 
(2.36) 
Diversifying  Indicator 
376.690 
(1.58) 
-8275.360 
(-1.43) 
-7898.670 
(-1.40) 
LSIZE 
146.991 
(1.61) 
-5197.960b 
(-2.34) 
-5050.969b 
(-2.33) 
First Difference in Market 
Value of Equity 
0.031 
(0.82) 
3.294a 
(3.52) 
3.325a 
(3.64) 
First Difference in Market 
Value of Equity Interacted 
with Diversifying Dummy 
0.036 
(0.83) 
-0.182 
(-0.17) 
-0.146 
(-0.14) 
First Difference in Volatility 
-517.658 
(-0.32) 
12409 
(0.31) 
11892 
(0.31) 
First Difference in Volatility 
Interacted with Multi-segment 
Indicator 
-1231.246 
(-0.48) 
-27656 
(-0.44) 
-28887 
(-0.48) 
R2 0.068 0.136 0.146 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
. 
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Table 12  
Logistic Regressions of Firms that Choose to Diversify (Matched Sample) 
 
This table contains results from the logistic regression of firms that choose to diversify on the corporate 
governance characteristics. The table includes 458 firm-year observations from 1992 through 2003. 229 of 
these belong to diversifying firms, and the remaining 229 belong to matched firms that stay focused. The 
dependent variable equals to one if the firm is a diversified firm. LSIZE is the logarithm of book value of total 
assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to 
total sales, and LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, TOBINQ is the market to book ratio of the firm, 
TCC is from the Compustat ExecuComp dataset. OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio 
owned by the CEO. LTOTAL is the natural logarithm of TCC, and OPTPORT. EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT 
to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, and 
BLOCKOWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; 
BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair of the Board; and CEOOWNPC, 
INSTOWNPC and BLOCKOWNPC are percentage ownership by CEOs, institutions and blockholders, 
respectively. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LSIZE 
2.429 
(0.92) 
2.440 
(0.91) 
5.612 
(1.41) 
5.835 
(1.41) 
EBIT/SALES 
0.628 
(0.95) 
0.667 
(0.99) 
0.518 
(0.57) 
0.422 
(0.43) 
CAPX/SALES 
-0.958 
(-1.25) 
-0.925 
(-1.22) 
-0.251 
(-0.25) 
-0.895 
(-0.85) 
LEVER 
0.607 
(0.86) 
0.381 
(0.54) 
2.133c 
(1.87) 
2.590c 
(2.03) 
TOBINQ 
-0.223b 
(-2.28) 
-0.200b 
(-2.33) 
-0.130 
(-1.00) 
-0.071 
(-0.44) 
LTOTAL 
0.173 
(1.14)   
-0.248 
(-0.95) 
EBP 
-0.792 
(-1.23)   
0.530 
(0.49) 
INSIDER  
-0.482 
(-0.80)  
-2.035c 
(-1.70) 
BOARDSIZE  
-0.067 
(-1.63)  
-0.157b 
(-2.14) 
DUAL  
0.014 
(0.06)  
0.172 
(0.50) 
CEOOWNPC   
-1.561 
(-0.62) 
-2.217 
(-0.79) 
INSTOWNPC   
-0.014 
(-1.50) 
-0.016 
(-1.56) 
BLOCKOWNPC   
0.008 
(1.25) 
0.007 
(1.04) 
CHI-SQUARE 
11.59 
(0.12) 
11.65 
(0.17) 
14.05 
(0.08) 
19.35 
(0.11) 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 13  
Change in Excess Value around Diversification and the Corporate Governance 
Characteristics  
 
This table contains results from the regression of change in excess value around diversification on 
the corporate governance characteristics. The dependent variable is the change in excess value of 
diversifying firms around diversification for OLS regressions. LSIZE is the logarithm of book value 
of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total sales, and LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, TCC is from the 
Compustat ExecuComp dataset. OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned 
by the CEO. LTOTAL is the natural logarithm of TCC, and OPTPORT. EBP is the ratio of 
OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and OPTPORT. INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, 
INSTOWNPC, and BLOCKOWNPC are from the Compact Disclosure dataset. INSIDER is the 
percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair 
of the Board; and CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC and BLOCKOWNPC are percentage ownership by 
CEOs, institutions and blockholders, respectively. 
 
Variable (1) OLS Regression 
Intercept 
0.805c 
(1.84) 
LSIZE 
-0.029 
(-0.63) 
EBIT/SALES 
0.077 
(0.20) 
CAPX/SALES 
0.408 
(0.89) 
LEVER 
-0.118 
(-0.42) 
LTOTAL 
-0.038 
(-0.56) 
EBP 
-0.274 
(-0.92) 
INSIDER 
0.047 
(0.19) 
BOARDSIZE 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
DUAL 
-0.057 
(-0.55) 
CEOOWNPC 
0.190 
(0.28) 
INSTOWNPC 
0.001 
(0.35) 
BLOCKOWNPC 
-0.003 
(-1.60) 
N 
113 
R2 
0.118 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 14   
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Diversification and the Corporate Governance 
Characteristics  
This table contains results from the regression of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around diversification on 
the corporate governance characteristics. The dependent variable is the CARs of different windows. LSIZE is the 
logarithm of book value of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio 
of capital expenditures to total sales, and LEVER is the ratio of total debt to total assets, TCC is from the 
Compustat ExecuComp dataset. OPTPORT is the Black-Scholes value of option portfolio owned by the CEO. 
LTOTAL is the natural logarithm of TCC, and OPTPORT. EBP is the ratio of OPTPORT to the sum of TCC and 
OPTPORT. INSIDER, BOARDSIZE, DUAL, CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC, and BLOCKOWNPC are from the 
Compact Disclosure dataset. INSIDER is the percentage of insiders on board; BOARDSIZE is the board size; 
DUAL is the CEO is also the Chair of the Board; and CEOOWNPC, INSTOWNPC and BLOCKOWNPC are 
percentage ownership by CEOs, institutions and blockholders, respectively. OFFERSTOCK is a dummy variable 
that equals one if the offer is not cash only, RELATED is a dummy variable that is one if the first three digit of 
first SIC code of the bidder is the same as that of the target. 
 
Variable         (-10,+1) (0,1) (-5,+5) Moving 
Intercept -0.048 
(-0.66) 
0.017 
(0.39) 
-0.021 
(-0.30) 
0.206 
(1.38) 
LSIZE 0.004 
(0.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
EBIT/SALES 0.049 
(0.70) 
0.010 
(0.23) 
-0.077 
(-1.11) 
0.040 
(0.28) 
CAPX/SALES -0.091a 
(-2.95) 
-0.020 
(-1.07) 
-0.048 
(-1.59) 
-0.017 
(-0.27) 
LEVER -0.056 
(-0.91) 
-0.037 
(-1.03) 
-0.033 
(-0.56) 
-0.201 
(-1.64) 
LTOTAL 0.008 
(0.77) 
0.011 
(1.63) 
0.020c 
(1.87) 
-0.014 
(-0.66) 
EBP -0.013 
(-0.21) 
-0.061c 
(-1.66) 
-0.110c 
(-1.81) 
0.154 
(1.23) 
INSIDER -0.011 
(-0.25) 
-0.021 
(-0.76) 
-0.063 
(-1.37) 
-0.089 
(-0.92) 
BOARDSIZE -0.003 
(-1.06) 
-0.003 
(-1.49) 
-0.006c 
(-1.96) 
-0.011c 
(-1.74) 
DUAL 0.026 
(1.44) 
0.013 
(1.20) 
0.026 
(1.49) 
0.046 
(1.24) 
CEOOWNPC 0.058 
(0.30) 
-0.009 
(-0.08) 
0.155 
(0.81) 
-0.182 
(-0.47) 
INSTOWNPC -0.000 
(-0.62) 
-0.000 
(-0.21) 
-0.000 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.91) 
BLOCKOWNPC 0.000 
(0.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.000 
(0.54) 
-0.000 
(-0.25) 
OFFERSTOCK 0.003 
(0.17) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.008 
(-0.50) 
0.037 
(1.20) 
RELATED 0.011 
(0.64) 
0.009 
(0.92) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.027 
(0.77) 
N 204 204 204 199 
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R2 0.140 0.074 0.066 0.084 
a: Significant at 1% level;. b: Significant at 5% level;. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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The extant literature has partly attributed the diversification discount to inefficient internal 
capital markets. Another competing explanation for the diversification discount is related to 
a reduction in firm risk, since it causes a transfer of wealth from shareholders to 
bondholders for levered conglomerates. In this paper, I argue that the diversity in 
investment opportunities, which causes internal capital market inefficiency, may be 
correlated with firm risk. I examine internal capital market inefficiency and firm 
risk/leverage simultaneously as determinants of the diversification discount. I find that 
relative to the coinsurance effect, internal capital market inefficiency is more important in 
explaining the excess value of diversified firms. To increase the power of my tests, I also 
examine sub-samples of diversified firms, such as all-equity firms and pseudo 
conglomerates.  Another issue I investigate in this paper is how the level of diversification 
affects firm value. The level of diversification may be related to both diversity in 
investment opportunities and firm risk. Even after controlling for firm risk and diversity in 
investment opportunities, I find that the more diversified a firm is, the lower value it has. It 
seems that diversification destroys value in ways other than through either inefficient 
internal capital markets or wealth transfer from shareholders due to lower firm risk. 
Although the risk of some firms decreases after diversification, there are other firms that 
become riskier after diversification. In such cases, there should be a transfer of wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders for levered firms. Therefore, in this paper, I also test how 
leverage affects shareholders’ value differently depending on whether there is an increase 
or decrease in firm risk after diversification. When I divide the diversifying firms into two 
sub-samples based on how risk changes around diversification, I find little evidence in 
support of the coinsurance effect. 
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Internal Capital Markets, Firm Risk, Leverage, and Corporate 
Diversification 
 
1. Introduction 
 The extant literature suggests that there is a diversification discount20 (see, for 
example, Berger and Ofek, 1995; Comment and Jarell, 1995; and Servaes, 1996). There are 
two main explanations for the diversification discount. Some studies attribute the 
diversification discount to inefficient internal capital markets in diversified firms. For 
example, Berger and Ofek (1995) document evidence that multi-segment firms’ cross-
subsidization of segments with poor growth opportunities can partially explain the lower 
excess value of diversified firms. The literature on internal capital markets argues that 
internal power struggles and rent seeking within a diversified firm can lead to investment 
distortions between divisions of a diversified firm, thereby resulting in a diversification 
discount (see, for example, Rajan et al., 2000; and Scharfstein and Stein, 2000).  Rajan et al. 
(2000) find that greater diversity in investment opportunities leads to more inefficient 
investments and lower excess value for diversified firms. 
An alternative explanation for the diversification discount is related to firm risk. 
Due to the imperfect correlation between the cash flows of different segments, diversified 
firms may have lower firm risk than focused firms. Decreased firm risk may cause a wealth 
transfer from shareholders to bondholders through what is known as the coinsurance effect. 
                                                 
20 Berger and Ofek (1995) compute the excess value as the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each segment’s 
imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. They 
estimate a regression of the excess value on firm diversification and some control variables. Their multi-
segment indicator variable captures the percentage difference in average excess value between single segment 
firms and multi-segment firms. If the coefficient of the multi-segment indicator is negative and significant, it 
is called the diversification discount. If it is not significant, there is no diversification discount. They find that 
the lost value from diversification (or what it is termed as the diversification discount) ranges from 13% to 
15% during the period 1986-1991. 
 55
Mansi and Reeb (2002) find that once the market value of bonds rather than the book value 
of bonds is used to compute the firm value, there is no diversification discount. An 
implication of their study is that diversification discount is a phenomenon of levered firms 
only and should be termed more precisely as shareholder value loss due to the wealth 
transfer to bondholders.  
The previous literature always looks at these two sources of the diversification 
discount separately. It is quite likely, however, that the diversity in investment 
opportunities may be related to the firm risk of diversified firms. For example, if there is a 
larger diversity in investment opportunities, the cash flows of these segments are less likely 
to be correlated with each other, and as a result, the variance of the firm’s overall cash 
flows may be lower.   Thus, the evidence that is being construed as being consistent with 
power struggles and/or rent seeking of divisional managers may also be consistent with a 
transfer of wealth from shareholders to bondholders in a diversified firm.  In this paper, I 
account for these two effects simultaneously in order to get a better idea of how important 
each is in determining the diversification discount. 
 I also study some interesting sub-samples of diversified firms in a further effort to 
separate out these two effects.  First, I examine a sub-sample of all-equity firms in an 
attempt to isolate the effect of internal capital market inefficiency as an explanation for the 
lower excess value of diversified firms.  In all-equity firms, firm risk will not play a role 
since these firms have no leverage, and thus, the question of wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders does not arise.  Therefore, if we find a negative relation 
between the excess value and the diversity in investment opportunities for these firms, it 
can be wholly attributable to investment distortions in multi-segment firms.  Second, I 
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isolate the effect of firm risk/leverage on the diversification discount by using a sub-sample 
of pseudo conglomerates. Since pseudo conglomerates have segments that all operate in the 
same four-digit SIC code, they will have very little if any diversity in investment 
opportunities, thus allowing me to focus on firm risk/leverage as the explanation for the 
discount.   
 The results of my analysis contribute to the literature in three important ways. First, 
it is the first study that looks into these two major sources of the diversification discount 
simultaneously and, therefore, provides a clearer picture of how cross-subsidization across 
divisions and the transfer of wealth from shareholders to bondholders each contributes to 
the diversification discount. I document evidence that diversity in investment opportunities 
is always strongly related to the excess value, while the coinsurance effect does not 
significantly affect the excess value in most cases. 
 Second, I argue that the level of diversification is related to both diversity in 
investment opportunities and firm risk. I, therefore, examine the relationship between the 
level of diversification and excess value after controlling for diversity and risk. I find that 
the level of diversification continues to negatively affect firm value. This means that 
diversification destroys value through more ways other than just its correlation with firm 
risk and diversity in investment opportunities.  
Third, I do not just simply assume that there is a decrease in firm risk after 
diversification. Instead, I argue that it is possible that firm risk increases after 
diversification and, in such cases, higher leverage may cause a transfer of wealth from 
bondholders to shareholders. Thus, I divide firms that diversify from a single segment to 
multiple segments into two sub-samples based on whether firm risk increases or decreases 
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around the diversification event. I then examine the relationship between the change in 
excess value and leverage for these two sub-samples separately. These tests enlighten us on 
how the interaction between the change in firm risk around diversification and the leverage 
of the firm affect firm value. The results from these tests also provide little support for the 
coinsurance effect. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of 
related literature and the development of hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the 
sample selection process. Section 4 explains the methodology used in the paper. Section 5 
provides and discusses descriptive statistics on the sample firms. Section 6 presents the 
results related to the factors that impact firms’ decision to diversify or remain focused, use 
all-equity financing or leverage in the capital structure, and be a pseudo-conglomerate or a 
real conglomerate.  The main results of empirical analysis are contained in Section 7. 
Section 8 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
2. Prior Literature and Development of Hypotheses 
2.1. Two Main Explanations of Diversification Discount  
 The literature on internal capital markets argues that the power struggles and the 
rent seeking within a diversified firm are related to the diversification discount. For 
example, in the model of Rajan et al. (2000), it is the diversity of investment opportunities 
and resources among the divisions of the firm that drives inefficient allocations or cross-
subsidization. The more diverse in investment opportunities a firm’s divisions are, the 
larger are the distortions in the allocation of resources generated by internal power 
struggles. They report empirical evidence that the diversity in investment opportunities 
leads to inefficient investment and low excess value for diversified firms. Scharfstein and 
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Stein (2000) argue that misallocation of investments across divisions can arise from rent-
seeking and bargaining between divisional managers and corporate headquarters. One of 
their main results is that this large cross-subsidization is more likely to happen for firms 
with bigger divergence in the strength of the divisions and lower CEO equity ownership.  
The lower firm risk of diversified firms can also be related to the diversification 
discount. The call option pricing model, such as the one proposed by Black and Scholes 
(1973), suggests that the adoption of projects which reduce the variance of the firms’ 
income distribution (such as diversification) may induce a wealth transfer from 
shareholders to bondholders, thus adversely affecting the value of the shareholders.21 This 
directly benefits bondholders by reducing their risk. Shareholders will be worse off because 
they are the holders of a call option on the firm's assets, and the value of this call option 
decreases when cash flow variance is reduced. 
 Diversified firms have lower firm risk due to the imperfect correlation of cash flow 
pattern of their different segments. The lower firm risk combined with leverage causes a 
wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders. Mansi and Reeb (2002) document 
evidence that the lower excess value of diversified firms is related to firm leverage. When 
they use the market value of both debt and equity to compute firm value, diversification is 
insignificantly related to firm value, and the diversification discount is insignificantly 
different from zero. However, they focus on the relationship between the leverage and firm 
value and find that leverage (defined as long-term debt/total assets) plays an important role 
in explaining the diversification discount. They just assume that this transfer of wealth 
from shareholders to bondholders is due to lower firm risk. Although they mention that 
                                                 
21 If a merger of the two firms entails no costs, it will benefit both firms because the resulting cash flow will 
be less volatile (Stulz, 1990). 
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firm risk can explain part of the diversification discount in a footnote (footnote 9 in their 
paper), they do not examine how diversification affects firm risk and how firm risk affects 
firm value, that is, they examine the relationship of diversification discount and leverage 
without controlling for firm risk. I adopt a different method. I examine the relationship 
between diversification discount and firm risk after controlling for firm leverage. I argue 
that if other factors (e.g., firm size, profitability, capital expenditure and leverage) are 
constant, then the diversified firms with lower risk will have lower revenue based excess 
value and larger diversification discount for any given level of leverage. 
2.2. Possible Relationship between Diversity of Investment Opportunities and Firm Risk 
 Diversity of investment opportunities and firm risk can be related to each other 
through the pair-wise cash flow covariance between segments as well as the cash flow 
variance of each segment. If investment opportunities are related to industry (different 
industries may have different investment opportunities), the diversity in investment 
opportunities may be related to the connection between different industries represented by 
the segments of diversified firms. For example, if two segments produce complementary 
products, the investment opportunities of these two segments should be similar. At the 
same time, as the demand for these related products changes, the cash flows of these two 
segments change in the same direction. If other factors are constant, then the variance of 
this firm’s cash flow should be higher than that of a firm which has a larger disparity in 
investment opportunities. In contrast, if there is high degree of diversity in the segments’ 
investment opportunities, the demand for the products of the different segments may be 
quite different. It follows that the covariance of the cash flows of these segments will be 
lower, and the firm will have a lower variance of overall cash flow.  
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 Diversity and firm risk can also be related through the cash flow variance of each 
segment. Suppose one segment of the firm is very large and has a high cash flow variance, 
while the other segment of the firm is small and has low cash flow variance. Both diversity 
measures22 will be big for this firm. At the same time, the overall risk of the firm will also 
be high. In this case, diversity and firm risk are positively correlated with each other. The 
correlation of diversity and firm risk is jointly determined by both the cash flow covariance 
of the segments and the cash flow variance of each segment of diversified firms.  
Burch and Nanda (2003) document evidence that the diversity in investment 
opportunities is significantly related to value improvements of spin-offs even after the 
inclusion of investment policy measures. This implies that diversity affects firm value 
through more than the change in investment policy. They argue that their results are in line 
with the model of Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992). In this model, the lobbying efforts 
of divisional managers can cause value losses even though the efforts do not lead to 
distorted investment policy. An inference from their results is that the diversity in 
investment opportunities is related to firm risk, and through the relationship of firm risk 
and equity value, diversity affects value. 
 The connection between different industries represented by the segments may affect 
the cash flow variance (and the firm risk) as well as the cash flow level of different 
segments of diversified firms. The extant literature on internal capital market has examined 
                                                 
22 The diversity measure proposed by Rajan et al. (2000) is the standard deviation of asset-weighted Q across 
segments divided by the simple average of the segment Qs, where industry Q values are used to proxy for 
segment Qs. The diversity measure proposed by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and used by Burch and Nanda 
(2003) measures diversity in raw divisional Qs and is not scaled by the simple average of segment Qs. For 
example, consider a firm with two divisions with asset weights of 0.40 and 0.60, and Q-values of 1.20 and 0.8, 
respectively. Here, RSZ will show a diversity value of zero since WQ =0.48 for both divisions, whereas BN 
will show a positive diversity value to reflect the difference in the raw Q-values. In contrast, if both divisions 
have the same Q-value but different sizes, the BN diversity will equal to zero but RSZ will be positive. I use 
both measures in this study, as it is hard to tell which measure is better than the other. 
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how the diversity in investment opportunities, through power struggle and rent seeking, 
affects the cash flow level of different segments. In this paper, I will examine how the 
diversity in investment opportunities affects the variance of the firm’s overall cash flow, 
and how, through its effect on firm risk, the diversity in investment opportunity affects the 
excess value of diversified firms.  
 I conjecture that by including firm risk, the explanatory power of diversity of 
investment opportunities of different segments (which proxy for the power struggle or rent 
seeking of division managers) will be affected. By doing so, we can get a more accurate 
picture of how much power struggles and rent seeking behavior in diversified firms will 
affect firm value.  
2.3. The Level of Diversification and Firm Risk 
Earlier studies have shown that an increase in the number of segments results in a 
higher diversification discount; and a decrease in the number of segments increase firm 
value, and the increase in value is highest if the divested segment is unrelated to the main 
business of the firm (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Comment and Jarrell, 
1995; John and Ofek, 1995; Berger and Ofek, 1999; Krishnawami and Subramaniam, 
1999).  For example, Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that a reduction of one in the 
number of SIC codes assigned by Compustat yields a 3% increase in annual stock returns, 
and a reduction of one in the number of segments yields a 5% increase in annual stock 
returns.  
I consider diversity in investment opportunities and firm risk as links between the 
number of segments and shareholder value and examine whether these two factors are the 
reason that the number of segments affects firm value. I assume that the cash flows of 
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different segments are not perfectly correlated. In this case, if we put the eggs in more 
baskets, the risk of losing all the eggs decreases. It follows that the increase in the number 
of segments will decrease the volatility of the firm’s cash flows, thereby decreasing 
shareholders’ value.  
 Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that sigma (measured as the standard deviation of 
the residuals from a regression using a single-factor market model) increases with the level 
of focus (measured as the revenue-based Herfindahl index), but they do not provide 
evidence of a reliable relation between equity beta (computed using a single-factor market 
model based on a year’s worth of weekly returns) and focus. I use the number of segments 
as a proxy for diversification level and examine the relationship between the level of firm 
diversification and firm risk (volatility of firm’s cash flow). I also test the relationship 
between the level of firm diversification and excess value after controlling for firm risk. If, 
after controlling for firm risk, the negative relationship between the level of diversification 
and excess value disappears, it follows that diversification does not destroy firm value. All 
that happens then is that diversification causes a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders. If, after controlling for firm risk, the relationship between the level of 
diversification and excess value becomes positive, it may imply that diversification creates 
value for the firm as a whole, even though it destroys shareholders’ value. 
The level of diversification can also be related to the diversity in investment 
opportunities. For example, as the number of segments decreases in spin-off, so does the 
diversity in investment opportunities (see, for example, Burch and Nanda, 2003). It seems 
that the more diversified a firm is, the higher diversity it has in investment opportunities. 
How diversity and the level of diversification are related to each other cross-sectionally is 
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still an empirical issue. In this paper, I examine how the number of segments affects firm 
value after firm risk and diversity are controlled for. 
2.4. Firm Risk, Leverage, and Diversification Discount 
Some firms may experience a decrease in firm risk after they diversify. However, if 
the new segment is much riskier than the existing one, we may actually observe an increase 
in firm risk after diversification23.  In this case, there should be a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders. Thus, it is necessary that we differentiate between these two 
cases and examine the relationship between leverage and firm value for them separately.  If 
the firm risk is lower after diversification, we expect a wealth transfer from shareholders to 
bondholders. For these firms, the revenue-based excess value will decrease with firm 
leverage. If the firm risk is higher after diversification, we expect a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to shareholders for firms. This wealth transfer will increase with firm leverage, 
and thus, the revenue-based excess value will increase with firm leverage.  
3. Variables and Sample Selection  
3.1. Excess Value 
 I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) to compute the excess value.  Excess value is 
computed as the logarithm of the ratio of the firm’s actual value to its imputed value. The 
actual value is the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, and the imputed 
value is the sum of the imputed stand-alone values for each business segment. To compute 
the imputed value of each business segment, I multiply the segment sales by the median 
                                                 
23 Erhemjamts (2005) find that on average, firm risk does not decrease after the diversification event. 
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market-to-sales ratio of the single-segment firms that are in the same industry of that 
business segment. 
  I get the data from the Compustat Industry Segment database for years 1984 to 
2004. I follow the previous studies such as Berger and Ofek (1995) and exclude firm-year 
observations when firms have segments in the financial services industry (SIC 6000-6999), 
or when firms have sales less than $20 million, or when firms do not report the value for 
the total capital, or when the sum of segment sales of the firm is not within one percent of 
the reported sales of the firm. In addition, I also exclude firm years when firms do not 
report four-digit SICs for all their segments. The final sample consists of a total of 66,424 
firm-year observations.   
 3.2. Diversity in Investment Opportunities 
 I use two measures of the diversity in investment opportunities. The first one is 
related to the proxy proposed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) (hereafter RSZ). RSZ 
used the standard deviation of asset weighted segment Q, scaled by the equally weighted 
segment Q to proxy for the diversity in investment opportunities: 
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where iw  is the asset weight of segment i , q is the Tobin’s q  for the industry that the 
segment is in, and n  is the number of segments the firm has. To make my two measures of 
diversity comparable, I use the numerator of the above equation, that is, the standard 
deviation of the asset weighted segment Q, as my first diversity measure. 
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Following Burch and Nanda (2003), I compute another measure of diversity in 
investment opportunities, which is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally 
weighted segment Qs: 
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where iw , q  and n  are the same as the first diversity measure. 
For both diversity measures, I use the median market to book value of assets of all 
the single segment firms in the industry which have the same SIC code as the segment to 
proxy for the segment Q.   Industry medians are calculated based on the narrowest SIC 
grouping that include at least five single segment firms. I follow Campa and Kedia (2002) 
to compute the market value of the firm, which is the sum of the market value of equity, 
short-term and long-term debt, and preferred stock. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I 
delete all firm years when the sum of the segment assets of the firm is not within seventy-
five percent of reported assets of the firm and when firms do not have all the data available 
to compute the market-to-book ratio. 
3.3 Firm Risk 
 Four proxies for firm risk are employed in this paper.  The first proxy is the 
standard deviation of ROA (which is operating income before depreciation divided by total 
assets). Specifically, ROA is measured as Compustat data item 21 divided by Compustat 
data item 44.  The second measure of risk is the standard deviation of operating cash 
flows.24 I compute these two risk measures for the single segment firms and the multiple 
                                                 
24 The operating cash flow is the operating income before depreciation and taxes plus decreases in accounts 
receivable, plus decreases in inventory, plus increases in accounts payable, plus decreases in other current 
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segment firms separately. For single segment firms (multiple segment firms), I require the 
firm to stay focused (diversified) for the current year and the next two years. Additionally, 
I require these firms to have data available to compute the operating cash flows for at least 
ten quarters in these three years. The standard deviation of monthly return is the third 
measure of firm risk. The daily market return data from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP) daily returns master tape are used to compute the monthly returns. 
These firms need to have daily data available for at least 19 trading days each month to get 
the monthly return and at least 11 months data to find the standard deviation of monthly 
return. Finally, I collect the weekly return data from CRSP and estimate the single-factor 
market model. The standard deviation of the residuals from this regression is used as the 
fourth measure of firm risk. 
3.4 Other Variables 
 To investigate the relation between corporate diversification and excess value, I use 
the same regression specified in Berger and Ofek (1995), which is: 
εβββββ +++++= )/()/()()( 43210 SALESCAPXSALESEBITLSIZENSEGEXVAL
            (1) 
where EXVAL is the excess value based on the Berger and Ofek (1995) measure; NSEG is 
the number of segments a firm has; LSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; 
EBIT/SALES is the EBIT-to-sales ratio; and CAPX/SALES represents the capital 
expenditures-to-sales ratio. As Mansi and Reeb (2002) show that leverage plays an 
important role in explaining the excess value and diversification discount, I also include 
                                                                                                                                                    
assets, plus increases in other current liabilities. Specifically, it is measured as Compustat data item 21 - (data 
item 37 - Lag (data item 37)) - (data item 38 – Lag (data item 38)) - (data item 39 – Lag (data item 39)) + 
(data item 46 - Lag (data item 46)) + (data item 48 - Lag (data item 48)). Kini et al. (2004) use this method to 
compute operating cash flow. 
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leverage into the above regression. I use the ratio of interest bearing debt (short-term and 
long-term debt) to total assets to measure leverage. 
4. Methodology 
4.1 OLS Regression and Sub-samples 
4.1.1. OLS Regression 
 
 To examine the relative importance of internal capital market inefficiency and firm 
risk/leverage, I add variables such as the diversity of investment opportunities, firm risk 
and the interactive term of firm risk and leverage to the equation (1). 
I estimate the following regression:  
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where DIVERSITY is one of my two measures of diversity in investment opportunities, 
RISK represents one of my proxies for firm risk, and RISK*LEVER is an interactive 
variable of risk and leverage.  All other variables are defined as before. 
 Mansi and Reeb (2002) use leverage to proxy for the coinsurance effect, but 
leverage can affect firm value through ways other than the coinsurance effect25, and we can 
not attribute all of its effect on firm value to the coinsurance effect. As it is leverage 
combined with firm risk that causes the wealth transfer between the bondholders and 
shareholders, I use the interactive term of leverage and firm risk to capture the coinsurance 
                                                 
25 If we treat higher leverage as an effective bonding device for management, higher leverage may lower 
agency costs and improve performance. Li and Li (1996) find that keiretsu (enterprise group, a prominent 
industrial structure in Japan) do have higher leverage and better performance than non-group firms. In 
contrast, according to their theory, the lower performance of the conglomerate merger wave in U.S. in 1960s 
is due to these firms’ lower leverage. Another example that leverage can affect firm value through ways other 
than the coinsurance effect is that higher leverage can benefit a firm by increasing interest tax shields but also 
have a detrimental impact of firm value through increased present value of expected bankruptcy costs. 
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effect. As my main concern is how internal capital market inefficiency and coinsurance 
effect each contribute to the lower excess value of diversified firms, I examine their 
coefficients and significance to see if one effect dominates the other. If the coefficient of 
diversity becomes insignificant after I include risk, it means that the diversity of investment 
opportunities does not affect total firm value but only affects shareholders value through its 
correlation with firm risk. Since firm risk only causes a wealth transfer between the 
bondholders and shareholders, it does not affect the firm value as a whole. However, if the 
interactive term of firm leverage and risk is insignificant but the diversity measures are still 
highly significant, it follows that the internal capital market inefficiency dominates the 
coinsurance effect in explaining the excess value of diversified firms. 
I also pay attention to the coefficient of the number of segments (NSEG) after I 
include the diversity and risk measures. If it is still negatively significant after diversity and 
risk are included, it follows that the level of diversification affects firm value through ways 
other than its correlation with internal capital market inefficiency and firm risk. If the 
coefficient of NSEG becomes positive after the inclusion of diversity and risk measures, it 
implies that diversification creates value after accounting for the coinsurance effect and 
internal capital market inefficiency. 
 I also compute the correlation matrix of the number of segments and different 
measures of diversity and risk. This test tells us how much of the variation of the number of 
segments is associated with diversity in investment opportunities and firm risk. 
4.1.2. Sub-samples: All-equity Firms and Pseudo Conglomerates 
 I use all-equity conglomerate firms to isolate the effect of diversity in investment 
opportunities on the excess value. I define all-equity firms as firms which have interest 
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bearing debt (long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) less than one percent of total 
assets. For firms with no leverage, the shareholders’ equity cannot be represented by a call 
option on the firm’s assets; therefore, there is no coinsurance effect. Put it in another way, 
as there is no bondholder for all-equity firms, the wealth transfer between shareholders and 
bondholders cannot arise. Thus, if there is any discount for all-equity firms, the discount 
should then be mainly attributable to inefficient internal capital markets.   
 I also use the pseudo conglomerate firms to isolate the impact of the coinsurance 
effect on excess value. Pseudo-conglomerates are diversified firms that have all divisions 
operate in the same finely defined industry, i.e., all segments share the same four-digit SIC 
code.  As all segments of pseudo-conglomerates share the same four-digit SIC code, they 
have the same growth opportunities. 26  Since there is no diversity in investment 
opportunities for pseudo-conglomerate firms, and because it is the diversity in investment 
opportunities that causes internal capital market inefficiency, the discount for pseudo-
conglomerates cannot be attributable to inefficient internal capital markets. It follows that 
if there is any diversification discount for pseudo conglomerates, it will be mainly caused 
by the lower firm risk in leveraged conglomerates.  
4.1.3. Sub-samples: Firm Risk Increases or Decreases around Diversification 
 According to the coinsurance effect theory, leverage can have different effects on 
shareholders’ value based on whether firm risk increases or decreases. When there is a 
decrease in firm risk, there will be a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders, so 
excess value decreases. However, when firm risk increases, wealth transfers from 
bondholders to shareholders, thus increasing the excess value. To further test the 
                                                 
26 Segment q’s are proxied by industry median market-to-book values, which are calculated at the four-digit 
SIC level whenever there are at least five single segment firms with available data, and at the three-digit SIC 
level or two-digit level as needed. 
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coinsurance effect, I divide my sample based on whether firm risk increases or decreases 
around diversification. I test the relationship between the change in excess value and the 
change in leverage for these two sub-groups. I estimate the following regression for these 
two sub-groups: 
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All the variables in the above specified regression are as defined earlier.  From this test, we 
learn how leverage affects excess value differently under situations where firm risk either 
increases or decreases after the addition of segment(s). 
4.2 Selection Bias 
Firms choose to diversify. Some latent factors that affect the firms’ propensity to 
diversify can also affect the firm value. It is necessary to control for the selection bias 
before we can draw a reasonable conclusion on how certain factors affect the excess value 
of diversified firms.  
4.2.1. Fixed Firm Effect Estimation 
 
Fixed firm effects allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, if we assume 
all these firm characteristics are fairly stable over time. As my dataset is a panel dataset, I 
use the fixed firm effect estimation as one way to control for the selection bias, assuming 
that the unobserved heterogeneity that causes the correlation between the error terms is 
constant over time. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), Campa and Kedia (2002) and 
Villalonga (2004) all use this methodology to control for the selection bias in their study. 
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4.2.2. Heckman’s Two Stage Model  
Heckman’s model deals with the bias that relates to the selection on unobservables.  
To identify this effect, there should be at least one variable that affects the selection 
equation but is not included in the value equation. Heckman’s model assumes joint 
normality of the error terms of the selection equation and the value equation with a non-
zero correlation. For example, this correlation is negative as hypothesized for diversified 
firms, leading the estimated discount, using OLS, to be biased downward. The first stage of 
Heckman’s model estimates a probit model (the selection equation) and gets the inverse 
mills ratio, and then in the second stage of the model, the inverse mills ratio is included in 
the value equation to correct for the selection bias. 
Like Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004), I use macroeconomic, 
industry, and firm level characteristics to predict firms’ propensity to diversify. At the 
macroeconomic level, I use the number and the annual value of merger and acquisition 
announcements (MNUM and MVOL) to capture the existence of merger waves and the real 
growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) and the number of months in the year that the 
economy was in a recession (CONTRACTION) to capture the macroeconomic conditions 
and business cycles. At the industry level, I use the fraction of all firms in the industry 
which are multi-segment firms (PNDIV), the fraction of sales in the industry accounted for 
by multi-segment firms (PSDIV), and industry q (INDQ) to capture the overall 
attractiveness of a given industry to conglomerates. At the firm level, the variables that I 
use are firm size (LSIZE), profitability (EBIT/SALES), investment (CAPX/SALES), growth 
opportunities (R&D/TA), firm age (LAGE), and free cash flow (DIVIDEND). In addition, I 
also create three dummy variables: MAJOREX (if a firm is listed in a major exchange, i.e., 
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NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ), S&P (if a firm belongs to the S&P industrial index or the 
transportation index), and FOREIGN (if a firm is incorporated abroad). MAJOREX and 
S&P control for information asymmetry and liquidity, respectively. A foreign firm may list 
in the U.S. as a part of corporate restructuring strategy, thus is more likely to engage in 
diversification activities. The computation of these variables is described in Campa and 
Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004). 
 Similarly, I use macroeconomic, industry, and firm level characteristics to predict 
firms’ propensity to be an all-equity firm or a pseudo-conglomerate. Sanzhar (2004) find 
that pseudo-conglomerates concentrate in certain industries, such as computer 
programming and communication equipment. This means that industry factors are 
important to determine the firms’ propensity to be pseudo-conglomerates.  Similar to 
pseudo-conglomerates, all-equity firms also tend to be in the technology related industries.  
I use the same variables at the macroeconomic level and firm level to predict a 
firms’ propensity to be an all-equity firm and a pseudo-conglomerate. Macroeconomic 
factors such as the GDP growth rate and the business cycle can have a more dramatic effect 
on technology related industry, thus influencing the probability of firms to be all-equity 
firms or pseudo-conglomerates. For example, it may be easier for these technology related 
firms to access equity capital during economic boom. Firm level characteristics can also be 
related to a firm’s probability to be an all-equity firm or a pseudo-conglomerate. Firms 
with good growth prospects usually are smaller, younger, less likely to pay dividends and 
spend more on capital expenditure and research and development. These firms are more 
likely to be in the technology related industries and be all-equity firms or pseudo-
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conglomerates. Firms listed on a major exchange have better access to equity capital and 
are more likely to be all-equity firms. 
At the industry level, I use the fraction of all firms in the industry which are all-
equity firms (pseudo-conglomerates) and the fraction of sales in the industry accounted for 
by all-equity firms (pseudo-conglomerates) to capture the overall attractiveness of a given 
industry to all-equity firms (pseudo-conglomerates). I also include industry q as an industry 
level instrument in the selection equation for pseudo-conglomerates and all-equity firms. 
I obtain the data on merger activities from the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), 
GDP growth rate and business cycles from National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER), firm age from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP), and other 
variables from Compustat.  
For the full sample, I use both single segment firms and multi-segment firms in the 
selection equation and only diversified firms in the value equation. For all-equity firms or 
pseudo-conglomerates, I use all diversified firms in the selection equation and all-equity 
diversified firms or pseudo-conglomerates in the value equation to control for the selection 
bias. 
5. Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 provides the distribution of excess value by year for multi-segment firms 
and single segment firms in the sample. The sample consists of 66,424 observations, 
46,561 of which are from single segment firms and 19,863 from multi-segment firms. For 
single segment firms, the median excess value for each year and for all the firm years are 
all close to zero. This is consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995) and Campa and Kedia 
(2002). The mean of the excess value of single segment firms is -0.006, which is 
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comparable with the one (0.001) reported by Berger and Ofek (1995). The mean (median) 
excess value for multiple segment firms is -0.102 (-0.109), while Berger and Ofek (1995) 
report mean (median) excess value of -0.097 (-0.106). The median excess value of multiple 
segment firms is negative in every year. It ranges from a low of -0.192 in year 1985 and 
2003 to a high of -0.054 in 1989. Due to the changes of rule on segment reporting (SFAS 
No.131), there is an increase in the number of multiple segment firms from 1998.27  
 The distribution of excess value by year for the all-equity firms is presented in 
Table 2. There are 8,735 firm years in my sample, 7,363 of these observations belong to 
single segment firms and the remaining 1,372 belong to multi-segment firms. The mean 
(median) excess value for the all-equity diversified firms is -0.063 (-0.078), which is higher 
than that of all diversified firms. The mean (median) excess value of the all-equity single 
segment firms is 0.122 (0.104), which is also higher than that of all single segment firms 
reported in Table 1. I also compute the excess value of all-equity firms based on Mansi and 
Reeb’s definition (long-term debt to total assets ratio is less than one percent). The mean 
(median) excess value of all-equity diversified firms based on their definition is -0.121 (-
0.132), which is even lower than what is reported for all diversified firms in Table 1. The 
mean (median) excess value of the all-equity single segment firms is 0.055 (0.027) for their 
definition of all-equity firms. 
                                                 
27 In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) adopted the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards 131 (SFAS 131) to replace the old segment-reporting rule SFAS 14. SFAS 14 required companies 
to report a segment if more than 10% of the firm’s assets, sales or profit could be attributed to that segment. 
SFAS 131 requires companies to report segments consistent with the way in which management organizes 
the business internally.
 
Therefore, the segment reporting is more consistent with the organizational structure 
of the firm under SFAS 131. After adoption of the new rule, many single segment firms started reporting their 
financials as multi-segment firms, while there were very few multi-segment firms that began reporting as 
single segment firms.  
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 The distribution of excess value by year for the pseudo-conglomerate firms is 
provided in Table 3. There are 2,472 pseudo-conglomerate firm years in the sample. I find 
the excess value of the pseudo-conglomerate firms is negative for most of the years. There 
are big time series variations of the excess value in the pseudo-conglomerate firms, with a 
premium of 18.8% in 1988 and a discount of -22.7% in 1992. It is noteworthy that more 
than three fourth of these firm-year observations belong to the years after 1998. The mean 
(median) excess value for pseudo-conglomerate firms is -0.103 (-0.100), whereas the mean 
(median) excess value is -0.102 (-0.111) for the real conglomerate firms. For real 
conglomerate firms, the excess value is negative for every year. 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics on the excess value, number of segments, 
total assets (ASSETS), sales, income to sales ratio (EBIT/SALES), net profit margin (NPM), 
capital expenditure to sales ratio (CAPX/SALES), capital expenditure to total assets ratio 
(CAPX/TA), firm leverage (LEVER), long-term leverage (LTDLEVER) and R&D to sales 
ratio (R&D/SALES) for multiple segment firms and single segment firms.  Consistent with 
the previous study (e.g., Berger and Ofek, 1995), I find that the diversified firms have 
significantly lower excess value, larger size, larger profitability ratios, lower capital 
expenditure intensity, higher leverage ratios, and lower R&D intensity than the single 
segment firms. Consistent with Berger and Ofek (1995), the median multiple segment firms 
is about three times the size of the median single segment firms both in terms of sales and 
assets. Both the mean and median leverage ratio of multiple segment firms is higher than 
that of the single segment firms, consistent with the findings of other research that 
diversified firms borrow more.  The mean R&D to sales ratio of diversified firms is less 
than half that of focused firms. 
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 Similar descriptive statistics are presented for all equity firms in Table 5.  I find that 
the all-equity diversified firms have significantly lower excess value, larger size, and lower 
R&D intensity than the all-equity focused firms. The median all-equity diversified firms 
are about one and a half times the size of the median all-equity focused firms in terms of 
sales and assets. The median R&D-to-sales ratio of all-equity diversified firms is only one 
sixth that of the all-equity focused firms.  
 Table 6 displays similar descriptive statistics for pseudo-conglomerate firms and 
real conglomerate firms. Interestingly, although the median (mean) excess value of pseudo-
conglomerate firms is higher (lower) than that of the real conglomerates, the difference is 
not statistically significant. I find that the pseudo-conglomerate firms have significantly 
fewer segments, smaller size, lower profitability ratios and leverage ratios, and higher 
R&D intensity than real conglomerate firms. The median pseudo-conglomerate firm has 
two segments, whereas the median real conglomerate firm has three segments. The median 
real conglomerate firm is about 1.5 times the size of the pseudo-conglomerate firm. The 
mean R&D to sales ratio of pseudo-conglomerate firms is more than twice that of real 
conglomerate firms.  
Table 7 describes the diversity in investment opportunities. Both the mean and 
median values using the RSZ measure are quite stable over time, with the mean (median) 
values across years ranging from 0.300 to 0.321 (0.262 to 0.283). This result is consistent 
with previous studies such as Rajan et al. (2000). In their study, the mean (median) of this 
diversity measure is 0.295 (0.251). The value in the diversity in investment opportunities 
using the Burch and Nanda (2003) method is also very stable, with the mean (median) 
value across years ranging from 0.086 to 0.231 (0.043 to 0.107). This diversity measure 
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reported by Burch and Nanda (2003) has a mean (median) of 0.149 (0.106) before spinoff 
and a mean (median) of 0.135 (0.096) after spinoff.  
The summary statistics of the four firm risk measures are reported in Table 8. There 
are 8,329 firm years that have data available to compute the standard deviation of operating 
cash flow (STD_OCF) and standard deviation of return on assets (STD_ROA). The mean of 
STD_OCF (STD_ROA) is 0.038 (0.014) and the median is 0.029 (0.010) for STD_OCF 
(STD_ROA). Due to the less restrictive requirements to compute the two market-based risk 
measures, the number of STD_MONRET (RMSE) is about the twice the number of 
STD_OCF (STD_ROA). STD_MONRET has a mean (median) of 0.125 (0.104), while 
RMSE has a mean (median) of 0.063 (0.052). 
I argue in this paper that because the number of segment, diversity, and firm risk 
measures are correlated with each other, it is necessary to examine the coinsurance effect 
and internal capital market inefficiency simultaneously. Table 9 presents the correlation 
matrix of the number of segments, the two diversity measures, and four risk measures. As 
can be seen from the table, the four risk measures are highly correlated with each other. 
The two accounting return based risk measures (STD_ROA and STD_OCF) have a 
correlation of 0.43 with each other and the two market return based risk measures 
(STD_MONRET and RMSE) have a correlation of 0.79 with each other. The range in the 
correlation coefficients between the accounting and market-based measures of risk is from 
0.21 to 0.32. However, the two diversity measures (RSZ and BN) are only 5.7% correlated. 
The risk measures are also correlated with the diversity measures, with STD_ROA 
(STD_MONRET) correlated with RSZ by 5.3% (7.1%) and with BN by 3.6% (4.2%). As 
expected, the number of segments is negatively correlated with the four risk measures, with 
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the correlation ranging from -8.1% (with STD_OCF) to -12.1% (with RMSE). The number 
of segments is positively related with the diversity measures, the correlation with RSZ is -
0.39, and the correlation with BN is only -0.053. All these correlations are significant at the 
one percent level. 
6. Selection Models 
 Firms choose to diversify or remain focused, use all-equity financing or some 
leverage in their capital structure, operate as a pseudo-conglomerate or a real conglomerate, 
etc. We attempt to model these choices in this section.  These choice models also serve a 
the first-stage in our later analysis of the determinants of excess value using Heckman’s 
two-stage methodology to control for self-selection. 
6.1. The Full Sample of Diversified Firms 
In this sub-section, we describe the results obtained from modeling a firm’s 
decision to diversify or remain focused by estimating a probit regression. The results of this 
probit model are reported in column one of Table 10. Firm level factors play an important 
role in firms’ decision to diversify. Firms with larger size (LSIZE), lower profitability 
(EBIT/SALES) and less investment in current operations (CAPX/SALES) are more likely to 
diversify. Firms that are older (LAGE) and have fewer investment opportunities (R&D/TA) 
are also more likely to diversify. At the industry level, the coefficient of the two variables 
that capture the attractiveness of an industry to diversify is positive, with the fraction of 
firms in the industry that are diversified (PNDIV) being highly significant. This is 
consistent with the results found by Campa and Kedia (2002). The industry q (INDQ) is 
positively and significantly related to a firm’s propensity to diversify; this is counter-
intuitive, but Villalonga (2004) also finds the coefficient of industry q to be positive. My 
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results regarding the GDP growth rate and business cycle are positive and consistent with 
the two studies mentioned above. My results regarding other variables (MVOL, NMERGER, 
S&P, MAJOREX, and FOREIGN) are all consistent with Villalonga (2004). MVOL is 
positive and insignificant and NMERGER is negative and significant, but the coefficients of 
both variables are close to zero. Finally, the coefficients associated with S&P, MAJOREX, 
and FOREIGN are all insignificant.  
6.2. The Sub Sample of All-equity Firms 
The results from a probit regression estimation of modeling a firm’s choice of being 
an all-equity firm are contained in the second column of Table 10. Firm level factors are 
important in a firm’s decision to be an all-equity firm. Firms with smaller size (LSIZE), 
higher profitability (EBIT/SALES), more investment in current operations (CAPX/SALES), 
and have more investment opportunities (R&D/TA) are more likely to be an all-equity firm. 
At the industry level, the coefficient of PNALEQ that captures the attractiveness of an 
industry to all-equity firms is positive and highly significant. Industry q (INDQ) is 
negatively related to firm’s propensity to be an all-equity firm, but is not significant.  
MVOL and NMERGER are insignificant, and the coefficients of these two variables are 
close to zero. The coefficient of S&P is negative and significant. The coefficient of 
MAJOREX is positive and significant as expected. Firm age (LAGE) and whether the firm 
is incorporated in a foreign country (FOREIGN) are not significant.  
6.3. The Sub Sample of Pseudo Conglomerates 
The results of the probability that a firm is a pseudo-conglomerate are displayed in 
column three of Table 10.  A firm with smaller size (LSIZE) and better investment 
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opportunities (R&D/TA) is more likely to be a pseudo-conglomerate. At the industry level, 
the coefficient of PNPSEU (the fraction of firms in the industry that are pseudo-
conglomerates) that capture the attractiveness of an industry to pseudo-conglomerates is 
positive and highly significant. Industry q (INDQ) is negatively related to a firm’s 
propensity to be a pseudo-conglomerate, but is not significant.  Both MVOL and 
NMERGER are insignificant, and their coefficients are close to zero. The coefficient of 
LAGE is negatively significant, which means younger firms are more likely to be pseudo-
conglomerates. All other variables are not significant.  
 
7. Main Results 
7.1 The Full Sample of Diversified Firms 
7.1.1. OLS Regression 
Table 11 displays the OLS regression results for the full sample of diversified firms. 
Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of diversity measures and risk measures. 
Column 2 includes diversity measures and column 3 and column 5 report results after 
adding STD_ROA and STD_MONRET as risk measures. Column 4 and column 6 include 
the interactive term of these two risk measures and leverage to capture the coinsurance 
effect. 
The number of segments is always negatively and significantly associated with the 
excess value, even after the inclusion of diversity measures and risk measures, implying 
that the level of diversification can affect firm value through ways other than inefficient 
internal capital market and the coinsurance effect. Leverage is positively related to the 
excess value, which is consistent with higher present value of interest tax shields, signaling 
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effect of debt, and disciplining effect of debt. However, the t-statistics of the leverage 
decrease noticeably after the interactive term of leverage with firm risk is included. In fact, 
leverage becomes insignificant after its interactive term with STD_MONRET is included. It 
seems that an important way that leverage affects firm value is through the coinsurance 
effect. Both diversity measures are always negatively and significantly related to the excess 
value, and the significance does not change much after risk measures are included. Firm 
risk is positively related to the excess value. This result may be attributable to the fact that 
high risk firms are more likely to be high growth firms. However, the significance of both 
risk measures decrease after the inclusion of their interactive term with leverage. After the 
interactive term is included, both STD_ROA and its interactive term with leverage are 
insignificant. Similar to leverage, firm risk affects firm value mainly through the 
coinsurance effect. Relative to the coinsurance effect, diversity has a much stronger effect 
on firm value. 
7.1.2. Fixed Effect Estimation 
I use the fixed firm and year effects to control for the unobservable firm and time 
characteristics that may affect a firm’s decision to diversify (or become an all-equity firm 
or a pseudo-conglomerate). Table 12 shows that the results on the number of segments, 
leverage, and diversity measures are practically identical to that of the OLS regression. 
However, firm risk seems to be negatively related to excess value, but this relationship is 
not significant. The interactive term of risk and leverage is not significant if STD_ROA is 
used as a risk measure, and it is at most significant at the 5% level if STD_MONRET is 
used as the risk measure.   
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7.1.3. Heckman’s Model 
The results of the second stage of the Heckman’s model are shown in Table 13. 
Both measures of diversity in investment opportunity are negatively and significantly 
related to firm value. The number of segments is also negatively and significantly related to 
the excess value. Leverage is positively related to the excess value, but it becomes 
insignificant after the interactive term of the market-based risk measure (i.e., 
STD_MONRET) and leverage is included. This is consistent with the results from OLS and 
fixed effect estimation that leverage affects firm value mainly through coinsurance effect. 
The interactive term of firm risk and leverage is insignificant when STD_ROA is used as 
the risk measure. When STD_MONRET is used as the risk measure, the interactive term of 
firm risk and leverage is only significant when BN is used as the diversity measure. It is 
also consistent with the previous tests that indicated that compared with the coinsurance 
effect, the inefficient capital market hypothesis has a relatively larger explanatory power 
for the lower excess value of diversified firms. 
7.2 The Sub Sample of All-equity Firms 
As all-equity firms are firms with no interest bearing debt, there is no coinsurance 
effect for these firms. Therefore, we can isolate the effect of internal capital market on 
excess value using the sub-sample of all-equity diversified firms. The results are reported 
in Table 14. In the OLS regression and Heckman’s model, the number of segments and one 
diversity measure (BN) are negatively and significantly related to the excess value, but the 
RSZ measure of diversity has only a very weak relation (insignificant) with the excess 
value. In the fixed effect estimation, both diversity measures are negatively and 
significantly associated with the excess value. In sum, the diversity measures can explain 
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part of the variation in the excess value of all-equity firms, and the level of diversification 
can destroy firm value through ways other than its connection with firm risk. 
7.3 The Sub Sample of Pseudo Conglomerates 
All segments of pseudo-conglomerates share the same four-digit SIC code, 
therefore, there is no diversity in investment opportunities for these firms (at least in the 
RSZ and BN sense). We can isolate the coinsurance effect for pseudo-conglomerates. As 
shown in Table 15, the sign of the number of segments is still negative, but the explanatory 
power of NSEG is lower after the risk measures are included. This is consistent with the 
previous finding that number of segments affects firm value through its connection with 
firm risk.  For the OLS regression and Heckman’s model, leverage, risk measures, and their 
interactive term are not significantly related to firm value. For fixed effect estimation, the 
risk measure STD_ROA is positively related to firm value, while the risk measure 
STD_MONRET is negatively related to firm value. Both leverage and its interactive term 
with risk measures are at most significantly related to firm value at the 10 percent level. In 
conclusion, the coinsurance effect does not have much influence on the excess value of 
pseudo-conglomerates.  
7.4 Robustness Check 
I use two other risk measures (STD_OCF and RMSE) and different time periods 
(1984-1997 and 1998-2004) to repeat all the tests in Tables 11 through 15. I also use the 
Herfindahl index (both revenue-based and asset-based) as another measure for the level of 
diversification. My robustness tests across all diversification measures, risk measures, time 
periods, and methodology reveal the following: First, the two diversity measures are 
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always negatively and significantly related to excess value, while the interactive term of 
leverage and risk measures are typically insignificant. It follows that diversity in 
investment opportunities has stronger power than coinsurance effect in explaining the 
excess value of diversified firms. Second, the number of segments is always negatively and 
significantly related to the excess value even after the inclusion of risk measures, implying 
that the level of diversification can affect firm value through ways other than its correlation 
with diversity and risk measures. Third, the leverage is positively related to firm value after 
the inclusion of risk and its interactive term with risk. This implies that leverage can affect 
firm value through ways other than the coinsurance effect.28  
7.5 The Relationship between Change in the Excess Value and Leverage  
To further test the coinsurance effect, I collect a sample of firms that diversify from 
single segment to multiple segments during the period 1984-2004. I divide this sample into 
two sub-samples based on whether firm risk increases or decreases after diversification. 
The results are shown in Table 16. The first column uses STD_ROA as a risk measure, 
while the second column and third column use STD_MONRET and RMSE as risk measures. 
There are more firms that increase their risk than decrease their risk. The results indicate 
that firms with higher profitability have higher excess value after diversification. I do not 
                                                 
28 I also compute Altman’s z and conduct my tests on a sub-sample of firms that are not likely to experience 
distress to do a robustness check on my results involving coinsurance effects (Tables 11-16). Altman's z is 
computed as working capital*1.2 + retained earnings*1.4 + EBIT*3.3 + Sales*0.999)/TA + MV of 
equity*0.6/BV of TL. Specifically, in terms of Compustat data items, it is computed as data4-data5)* 1.2 + 
data36*1.4 + data178*3.3 + data12*0.999)/data6 + ((data199*data25)/(data5+data9))*0.6. If the score is 
above 3.0, then bankruptcy is not likely; if it is less than 1.8, than bankruptcy is likely. The size of this sub-
sample is about half of the whole sample for all diversified firms and pseudo conglomerates and is about the 
same for all-equity firms. I find that while the two diversity measures are still negatively significant, the 
interactive term of firm risk and leverage is not significant, just as in the whole sample.  It is noteworthy that 
the leverage is no more significant in most of the cases in this sub-sample. For all-equity diversified firms and 
pseudo conglomerates, the results in the sub-sample are basically the same as those in the full sample of these 
firms. 
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find a significant relationship between the change in excess value and leverage. For firms 
that increase the risk, the higher leverage leads to lower excess value when STD_MONRET 
are used as the risk measure, while for firms that decrease the risk, higher leverage is 
related to higher excess value. This is inconsistent with the coinsurance hypothesis that an 
increase in firm risk causes a wealth transfer from bondholders to shareholders and a 
decrease in firm risk causes a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders.  
8. Conclusion 
 
 The existing literature suggests that the diversification discount can be partially 
explained by internal capital market inefficiency as well as lower firm risk of diversified 
firms. The internal capital market inefficiency affects firm value through power struggle 
and rent seeking. In contrast, lower firm risk combined with the leverage only causes a 
wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders and should not affect the firm value as a 
whole. As an important variable that drives internal capital market inefficiency, the 
diversity in investment opportunities is likely to be correlated with the firm risk. My 
primary objective in this paper is to separate the effect of the internal capital market 
inefficiency from the effect of the lower firm risk on excess value. To make my tests 
complete, I also isolate these effects by studying all-equity multi-segment firms and 
pseudo- conglomerates.   From both the full sample and the two sub-samples, I find that 
diversity in investment opportunity is always negatively and significantly related to firm 
value. However, firm risk measures and their interactive term with leverage are generally 
not significant. An interpretation of these results is that diversity in investment 
opportunities is more important in determining the excess value of diversified firms than 
the coinsurance effect.  
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 The previous research finds that the number of segments is negatively correlated 
with excess value. The number of the segments is also correlated with firm risk and 
diversity; therefore, it can affect excess value through firm risk, diversity, or other factors 
such as synergies. By controlling for firm risk and diversity, we can get a clearer picture of 
how and to what extent the number of segments (or the level of diversification) affects firm 
value. I find that the number of segments is still negatively associated with firm value, 
implying that the level of diversification destroys firm value through ways other than firm 
risk and diversity. 
 For some firms, firm risk decreases after diversification. In this case, under the 
coinsurance effect, leverage will be negatively related to excess value. However, there are 
other firms for whom firm risk increases after diversification, and there will be a wealth 
transfer from bondholders to shareholders for these firms. I collect a sample of firms that 
diversify from single segment firms to multiple segment firms during 1984-2004. I divide 
these firms into two sub-samples based on whether the firm risk increases or decreases 
around the diversification event. I do not find any evidence in support of the coinsurance 
effect. When standard deviation of monthly return is used as the risk measure, the 
relationship between the leverage and the change in firm value is negative when risk 
increases after diversification, and this relationship is positive for firms that decrease their 
risk after diversification for all risk measures. The results based on the change of firm risk 
around diversification corroborate my main findings that coinsurance effect is not very 
powerful in explaining the cross-sectional variations of the excess value in diversified firms.  
It is worth noting that the number of segments is negatively correlated with 
diversity in investment opportunity measures for diversified firms.  The correlation matrix 
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shows that the more diversified a firm is, the lower is the diversity in investment 
opportunities. This is in stark contrast to the spin-off literature which contends that as the 
number of segments decreases, the diversity of investment opportunities also drops. 
However, as some of the literature suggests, the drop in diversity of investment 
opportunities usually happens when a firm performs poorly prior to the spin-off. If the firm 
performs well before the spin-off, it is not clear how the level of diversification is related to 
diversity.  Do diversified firms with more segments have a more efficient internal capital 
market than diversified firms with fewer segments? How does the increase in the number 
of segments affect the diversity as well as the internal capital markets? These are some 
interesting questions for future research.  
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Table 1 
The Distribution of Excess Value by Year 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the estimated excess value using sales multipliers by year. 
The table includes 66,424 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 46,561 of them are single 
segment firm years and 19,863 are multiple segment firm years. Excess value is the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value 
of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its 
industry median ratio of capital to sales.  
 
Total Sample Single Segment Multiple Segment Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median
1984 2605 -0.050 -0.041 1577 0.018 0.000 1028 -0.155 -0.186 
1985 2636 -0.047 -0.050 1669 0.007 0.000 967 -0.140 -0.192 
1986 2690 -0.034 -0.020 1781 0.006 0.000 909 -0.113 -0.121 
1987 2852 -0.012 0.000 1968 0.009 0.000 884 -0.059 -0.056 
1988 2800 -0.015 0.000 1960 0.006 0.000 840 -0.063 -0.078 
1989 2740 -0.007 0.000 1961 0.014 0.000 779 -0.060 -0.054 
1990 2726 -0.013 0.000 1964 0.008 0.000 762 -0.067 -0.063 
1991 2805 -0.037 -0.013 2039 -0.015 0.000 766 -0.096 -0.101 
1992 3070 -0.031 -0.007 2268 -0.010 0.000 802 -0.089 -0.104 
1993 3405 -0.033 -0.010 2588 -0.007 0.000 817 -0.118 -0.096 
1994 3732 -0.030 -0.011 2865 -0.006 0.000 867 -0.109 -0.122 
1995 4001 -0.033 -0.010 3120 -0.016 0.000 881 -0.092 -0.093 
1996 4298 -0.019 0.000 3432 -0.003 0.000 866 -0.085 -0.085 
1997 4467 -0.024 0.000 3634 -0.013 0.000 833 -0.073 -0.073 
1998 3874 -0.040 -0.014 2590 -0.035 0.000 1284 -0.050 -0.072 
1999 3327 -0.076 -0.042 2042 -0.045 0.000 1285 -0.125 -0.121 
2000 3176 -0.060 -0.032 2038 -0.028 0.000 1138 -0.117 -0.136 
2001 2967 -0.040 -0.016 1880 0.000 0.000 1087 -0.108 -0.117 
2002 2929 -0.016 0.000 1831 0.004 0.000 1098 -0.050 -0.062 
2003 2832 -0.060 -0.027 1778 0.004 0.000 1054 -0.170 -0.192 
2004 2492 -0.070 -0.054 1576 -0.003 0.000 916 -0.185 -0.183 
Total 66424 -0.035 -0.013 46561 -0.006 0.000 19863 -0.102 -0.109 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91
 
Table 2 
The Distribution of Excess Value of All-Equity Firms by Year 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the estimated excess value of all-equity firms using sales 
multipliers by year.  All-equity firms are defined as those firms with interest bearing debt (long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities) to total assets ratio less than one percent. The table includes 8,735 
firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 7,363 of them are single segment firm years and 1,372 
are multiple segment firm years. Excess value is the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its 
imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to 
sales.  
 
Total Sample Single Segment Multiple Segment Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
1984 160 0.153 0.125 124 0.210 0.184 36 -0.042 -0.066 
1985 170 0.110 0.126 136 0.139 0.148 34 -0.006 -0.039 
1986 166 0.113 0.120 130 0.178 0.144 36 -0.121 -0.057 
1987 188 0.145 0.084 154 0.199 0.154 34 -0.096 -0.113 
1988 183 0.125 0.173 154 0.157 0.221 29 -0.044 0.066 
1989 205 0.193 0.169 171 0.201 0.172 34 0.156 0.097 
1990 204 0.132 0.107 174 0.154 0.117 30 0.005 -0.123 
1991 271 0.149 0.130 240 0.146 0.130 31 0.177 0.170 
1992 348 0.174 0.214 306 0.193 0.223 42 0.037 0.161 
1993 441 0.146 0.124 393 0.172 0.149 48 -0.072 -0.126 
1994 498 0.118 0.069 437 0.147 0.118 61 -0.088 -0.099 
1995 547 0.085 0.054 494 0.097 0.059 53 -0.030 -0.034 
1996 632 0.104 0.095 580 0.108 0.097 52 0.064 0.008 
1997 711 0.069 0.057 653 0.081 0.066 58 -0.071 0.003 
1998 590 0.079 0.096 504 0.106 0.113 86 -0.081 -0.002 
1999 481 -0.015 0.000 380 0.022 0.019 101 -0.156 -0.311 
2000 523 0.062 0.032 438 0.091 0.076 85 -0.091 -0.182 
2001 547 0.081 0.046 441 0.105 0.071 106 -0.017 -0.053 
2002 610 0.074 0.058 468 0.100 0.078 142 -0.013 -0.049 
2003 650 0.067 0.058 500 0.145 0.121 150 -0.194 -0.233 
2004 610 0.067 0.063 486 0.112 0.086 124 -0.111 -0.105 
Total 8735 0.093 0.081 7363 0.122 0.104 1372 -0.063 -0.078 
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Table 3 
The Distribution of Excess Value of Pseudo-Conglomerate Firms by Year 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the estimated excess value of pseudo-conglomerate firms 
using sales multipliers by year. Pseudo-conglomerates are diversified firms that have all divisions 
operate in the same finely defined industry, i.e., all segments share the same four-digit SIC code. 
The table includes 19,863 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 17,391 of them are real 
conglomerate firm years and 2,472 are pseudo-conglomerate firm years. Excess value is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the 
imputed value of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale 
multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales.  
 
Real Conglomerate Pseudo Conglomerate Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
1984 1003 -0.155 -0.187 25 -0.129 -0.100 
1985 940 -0.144 -0.194 27 0.002 0.042 
1986 889 -0.119 -0.130 20 0.141 0.163 
1987 856 -0.061 -0.059 28 -0.001 -0.011 
1988 810 -0.069 -0.098 30 0.105 0.188 
1989 751 -0.061 -0.059 28 -0.028 -0.018 
1990 733 -0.066 -0.065 29 -0.082 0.014 
1991 731 -0.093 -0.101 35 -0.165 -0.133 
1992 763 -0.080 -0.086 39 -0.266 -0.227 
1993 768 -0.111 -0.086 49 -0.220 -0.152 
1994 812 -0.111 -0.124 55 -0.075 -0.029 
1995 821 -0.102 -0.103 60 0.045 0.080 
1996 802 -0.089 -0.091 64 -0.037 -0.050 
1997 761 -0.080 -0.074 72 -0.007 -0.048 
1998 1033 -0.053 -0.078 251 -0.041 -0.042 
1999 1019 -0.117 -0.109 266 -0.157 -0.173 
2000 900 -0.100 -0.120 238 -0.182 -0.217 
2001 830 -0.120 -0.130 257 -0.070 -0.069 
2002 787 -0.059 -0.061 311 -0.028 -0.066 
2003 744 -0.169 -0.174 310 -0.171 -0.213 
2004 638 -0.192 -0.170 278 -0.170 -0.203 
Total 17391 -0.102 -0.111 2472 -0.103 -0.100 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for Multiple Segment Firms and Single Segment Firms 
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the multiple segment firms and single segment firms. EXVAL is the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual 
value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each segment’s imputed value equal to the 
segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, ASSETS is the book 
value of total assets, SALES is the book value of total sales, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of 
interest bearing debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to 
total sales. The table includes 66,424 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 46,561 of these firm-year observations belong to single 
segment firms. The remaining 19,863 observations belong to multiple segment firms.  
 
Multiple (N=19,863) Single (N=46,561) Difference (Multiple – Single)Variable 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL -0.102 -0.109 0.564 -0.006 0.000 0.584 -19.84a -19.81a 
NSEG 2.831 3.000 1.076 1.000 1.000 0.000 239.94a 253.18a 
ASSETS ($ m.) 2366.680 395.865 7349.360 937.457 132.413 4075.920 25.77a 60.58a 
SALES ($ m.) 2142.480 415.151 7118.280 873.147 142.053 4086.470 23.53a 62.37a 
EBIT/SALES 0.073 0.073 0.085 0.067 0.068 0.103 8.36a 6.39a 
NPM 0.005 0.033 0.404 -0.022 0.033 0.463 7.45a -0.66 
CAPX/SALES 0.069 0.043 0.073 0.078 0.044 0.087 -13.28a -0.40 
CAPX/TA 0.064 0.049 0.060 0.076 0.052 0.082 -21.51a -8.64a 
LEVER 0.296 0.278 0.237 0.261 0.224 0.271 16.43a 26.84a 
LTDLEVER 0.231 0.209 0.211 0.198 0.141 0.240 17.81a 31.39a 
R&D/SALES 0.020 0.000 0.066 0.046 0.000 0.166 -28.68a -3.79a 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 5 
Summary Statistics for All-Equity Firms 
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the all-equity multiple segment firms and all-equity single segment firms. All-equity firms are defined 
as those firms with an interest bearing debt (long-term debt and debt in current liabilities) to total assets ratio less than one percent. EXVAL is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NSEG is the number of business 
segments a firm has, ASSETS is the book value of total assets, SALES is the book value of total sales, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total 
sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and 
R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales. The table includes 8,735 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 7,363 of 
these firm-year observations belong to all-equity single segment firms. The remaining 1,372 observations belong to all-equity multiple segment 
firms.  
 
Multiple (N=1,372) Single (N=7,363) Difference (Multiple – Single) Variable 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL -0.063 -0.078 0.659 0.122 0.104 0.647 -9.67
a -9.52a 
NSEG 2.464 2.000 0.784 1.000 1.000 0.000 69.13
a 93.14a 
ASSETS ($ m.) 393.126 123.026 1279.210 251.881 84.443 1019.200 3.87
a 8.46a 
SALES ($ m.) 430.110 124.726 1345.410 295.607 84.148 1151.840 3.47
a 9.51a 
EBIT/SALES 0.046 0.075 0.209 0.032 0.083 0.342 1.95
c -2.67a 
NPM 0.010 0.053 0.272 -0.029 0.057 0.754 3.34
a -2.45b 
CAPX/SALES 0.063 0.033 0.114 0.065 0.038 0.129 -0.55 -3.54
a 
CAPX/TA 0.057 0.039 0.072 0.059 0.042 0.073 -1.04 -2.26
b 
LEVER 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 4.85
a 4.81a 
LTDLEVER 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 4.95
a 4.79a 
R&D/SALES 0.053 0.007 0.112 0.101 0.046 0.178 -13.17
a -10.98a 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 6 
Summary Statistics for Pseudo-Conglomerate Firms and Real Conglomerate Firms 
 
This table displays descriptive statistics for pseudo-conglomerate firms and real conglomerate firms. Pseudo-conglomerates are diversified firms 
that have all divisions operate in the same finely defined industry, i.e., all segments share the same four-digit SIC code. EXVAL is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is the sum of the imputed value of its segments, with each 
segment’s imputed value equal to the segment’s sale multiplied by its industry median ratio of capital to sales. NSEG is the number of business 
segments a firm has, ASSETS is the book value of total assets, SALES is the book value of total sales, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total 
sales, NPM is the ratio of NI to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, CAPX/TA is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, LTDLEVER is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and 
R&D/SALES is the ratio of R&D expenditures to total sales. The table includes 19,863 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. 2,472 of 
these firm-year observations belong to pseudo-conglomerate firms. The remaining 17,391 observations belong to real conglomerate firms.  
 
Pseudo Conglomerates (N=2,472) Real Conglomerates (N=17,391) Difference (Pseudo – Real) 
Variable 
Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev T-Stat Z-Stat 
EXVAL -0.103 -0.100 0.629 -0.102 -0.111 0.554 -0.03 -0.12 
NSEG 2.525 2.000 0.986 2.875 3.000 1.081 -16.28a -18.87a 
ASSETS ($ m.) 1608.910 289.796 4602.190 2474.390 416.310 7654.300 -7.92a -8.36a 
SALES ($ m.) 1369.410 277.681 3977.770 2252.370 442.710 7451.660 -9.01a -10.67a 
EBIT/SALES 0.060 0.066 0.100 0.075 0.073 0.082 -7.41a -6.20a 
NPM -0.037 0.028 0.370 0.011 0.034 0.409 -5.94a -6.42a 
CAPX/SALES 0.070 0.041 0.079 0.069 0.043 0.072 0.77 -3.01a 
CAPX/TA 0.062 0.043 0.068 0.064 0.050 0.058 -1.02 -6.92a 
LEVER 0.278 0.257 0.306 0.298 0.281 0.225 -3.06a -6.54a 
LTDLEVER 0.216 0.191 0.272 0.233 0.211 0.201 -3.06a -6.95a 
R&D/SALES 0.040 0.000 0.136 0.017 0.000 0.047 8.19a 6.29a 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 7 
The Distribution of the Value of Diversity in Investment Opportunities by Year 
 
This table displays summary statistics for the value of diversity in investment opportunities by year. 
The table includes 22,259 firm-year observations from 1984 through 2004. The diversity in 
investment opportunities is computed as a variant of the Rajan et al. (2000) measure, which is the 
standard deviation of asset-weighted segment q’s: 
Diversity= ∑
1
)(
1=
2n
j
jj
n
wqqw
, 
I also compute the diversity in investment opportunities using the Burch and Nanda (2003) measure, 
which is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally-weighted segment Qs: 
Diversity= ∑
= −
−n
j
jj
n
qqw
1
2
1
)(
 
RSZ Measure BN Measure Year 
Number Mean Median Number Mean Median 
1984 1094 0.301 0.262 1094 0.116 0.089 
1985 1007 0.302 0.263 1007 0.121 0.083 
1986 971 0.301 0.265 971 0.122 0.082 
1987 929 0.300 0.272 929 0.093 0.063 
1988 921 0.301 0.268 921 0.088 0.058 
1989 894 0.308 0.267 894 0.118 0.080 
1990 879 0.312 0.275 879 0.107 0.074 
1991 863 0.313 0.277 863 0.149 0.100 
1992 913 0.306 0.276 913 0.139 0.091 
1993 906 0.310 0.283 906 0.145 0.106 
1994 937 0.303 0.267 937 0.124 0.097 
1995 972 0.305 0.269 972 0.150 0.098 
1996 964 0.303 0.268 964 0.159 0.104 
1997 903 0.305 0.265 903 0.157 0.107 
1998 1406 0.302 0.270 1406 0.121 0.070 
1999 1502 0.313 0.265 1502 0.231 0.081 
2000 1392 0.312 0.269 1392 0.140 0.071 
2001 1304 0.316 0.272 1304 0.140 0.068 
2002 1237 0.321 0.281 1237 0.086 0.043 
2003 1237 0.308 0.274 1237 0.132 0.067 
2004 1028 0.310 0.271 1028 0.126 0.069 
Total 22259 0.308 0.270 22259 0.134 0.080 
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Table 8 
Summary Risk Statistics for Multiple-Segment Firms 
 
This table provides summary statistics for four measures of firm risk of multi-segment firms. 
STD_OCF is the standard deviation of operating cash flow, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of 
return on assets, STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly return, and RMSE is the 
standard deviation of the residuals from the single factor market model based on weekly returns.  
 
Variable Number Mean Median Std. Dev 
STD_OCF 8,329 0.038 0.029 0.034 
STD_ROA 8,329 0.014 0.010 0.013 
STD_MONRET 16,466 0.125 0.104 0.085 
RMSE 16,466 0.063 0.052 0.041 
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Table 9 
Correlation Matrix of the Number of Segments, Risk Measures, and Diversity Measures 
This table displays the correlation matrix of the number of segments, risk measures, and diversity measures. NSEG is the number of business 
segments a firm has, STD_OCF is the standard deviation of operating cash flow, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on assets, 
STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly return, and RMSE is the standard deviation of the residuals from the single factor market 
model based on weekly returns, RSZ is the standard deviation of asset-weighted segment q’s and BN is the asset-weighted standard deviation of 
equally weighted segment q’s. 
 NSEG STD_OCF STD_ROA MONRET RMSE RSZ BN 
NSEG 1 
 
16,466 
-0.081a 
<.0001 
8,329 
-0.097 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
-0.088 a 
<.0001 
16,466 
-0.121 a 
<.0001 
16,466 
-0.387 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
-0.053 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
STD_OCF  1 
 
8,329 
0.427 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
0.206 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
0.267 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
-0.009 
0.4725 
6,914 
0.012 
0.3094 
6,914 
STD_ROA   1 
 
8,329 
0.272 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
0.323 a 
<.0001 
8,329 
0.053 a 
<.0001 
6,914 
0.036 a 
0.0024 
6,914 
STD_MONRET    1 
 
16,466 
0.792 a 
<.0001 
16,466 
0.071 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
0.042 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
RMSE     1 
 
16,466 
0.073 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
0.034 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
RSZ      1 
 
13,406 
0.057 a 
<.0001 
13,406 
BN       1 
 
13,406 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level 
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Table 10 
Probit Estimates for Firms to be a Diversified Firm, an All-Equity Firm, and a Pseudo-
Conglomerate 
The dependent variable Dummy takes the value of 1 when the firm is a diversified firm (an all-equity firm, a 
pseudo-conglomerate) and 0 if it is a focused firm (a levered firm, a real conglomerate). LSIZE is the natural 
log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total sales, DIVIDEND is the total dividend paid, R&D/TA is the ratio of R&D to total assets, 
INDQ is the industry q, S&P is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a firm is part of the S&P index and 0 
otherwise, MAJOREX is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm is listed on Nasdaq, NYSE, or AMEX, 
and 0 otherwise, FOREIGN is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm is incorporated outside of the U.S., 
and 0 otherwise. PNDIV (PVALEQ, PNPSEU) is a fraction of all firms in the industry that are diversified 
firms (all-equity firms, pseudo-conglomerates), PSDIV(PSALEQ, PSPSEU) is the fraction of industry sales 
accounted for by diversified firms (all-equity firms, pseudo-conglomerates). NMERGER is the number of 
announced mergers/acquisitions in the year, while MVOL is the U.S. dollar value of these 
mergers/acquisitions. GROWTH is the growth rate in real GDP, while the variable CONTRACTION is the 
number of months in the year that the economy was in a recession. 
 
Dummy 
Variable 
Diversified firm All-equity firm Pseudo-conglomerate 
LSIZE 0.151a 
(0.00) 
-0.193 a 
(0.00) 
-0.050 b 
(0.04) 
EBIT/SALES -1.093 a 
(0.00) 
2.274 a 
(0.00) 
0.459 
(0.22) 
CAPX/SALES -0.911 a 
(0.00) 
0.854 c 
(0.09) 
0.411 
(0.36) 
DIVIDEND 0.000 
(0.41) 
-0.002 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.50) 
R&D/TA -1.588 a 
(0.00) 
1.580 a 
(0.00) 
0.956 c 
(0.06) 
INDQ 0.147 a 
(0.00) 
-0.092 
(0.12) 
-0.042 
(0.40) 
S&P 0.007 
(0.93) 
-0.430 b 
(0.03) 
-0.103 
(0.47) 
PNDIV(PNALEQ, PNPSEU) 3.011 a 
(0.00) 
5.662 a 
(0.00) 
4.513 a 
(0.00) 
PSDIV(PSALEQ, PSPSEU) 0.040 
(0.57) 
-0.317 
(0.26) 
-0.091 
(0.56) 
MVOL 0.000 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.96) 
NMERGER -0.000 b 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(0.69) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
GROWTH 0.019 a 
(0.00) 
-0.027 
(0.12) 
-0.016 
(0.30) 
CONTRACTION 0.004 c 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(0.92) 
-0.001 
(0.88) 
MAJOREX -0.024 
(0.59) 
0.490 a 
(0.00) 
0.059 
(0.52) 
FOREIGN 0.038 
(0.51) 
-0.010 
(0.95) 
0.056 
(0.59) 
LAGE 0.242 a 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.68) 
-0.131 a 
(0.00) 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level 
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Table 11 
OLS Regression Results for All Diversified Firms 
This table contains OLS results from regressing excess value on the number of segments, diversity, firm risk and various control variables. EXVAL is the natural logarithm 
of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of 
EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, RSZ is the standard deviation 
of asset-weighted segment Qs and BN is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally weighted segment Qs, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on assets, 
STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly return. Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of diversity and risk measures. Column 2 adds diversity measure 
as another control variable. Column 3 (column 5) add STD_ROA (STD_MONRET) as the risk measure. Column 4 and column 6 also include the interactive variable of 
firm risk and leverage.  
OLS regression (RSZ) OLS regression (BN)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
INTERCEPT -0.483a 
(-31.54) 
-0.434 a 
(-21.87) 
-0.516 a 
(-14.99) 
-0.514 a 
(-14.06) 
-0.588 a 
(-23.65) 
-0.541a 
(-19.17) 
-0.508 a 
(-29.15) 
-0.579 a 
(-18.02) 
-0.570 a 
(-16.44) 
-0.653 a 
(-28.03) 
-0.594 a 
(-21.87) 
NSEG  -0.027 a 
(-7.31) 
-0.041 a 
(-9.60) 
-0.035 a 
(-5.20) 
-0.035 a 
(-5.20) 
-0.040 a 
(-8.54) 
-0.040 a 
(-8.44) 
-0.026 a 
(-6.42) 
-0.017 a 
(-2.70) 
-0.017 a 
(-2.71) 
-0.024 a 
(-5.31) 
-0.024 a 
(-5.29) 
LSIZE 0.034 a 
(13.95) 
0.036 a 
(14.04) 
0.048 a 
(11.66) 
0.048 a 
(11.66) 
0.048 a 
(16.45) 
0.048 a 
(16.39) 
0.037 a 
(14.33) 
0.047 a 
(11.56) 
0.047 a 
(11.57) 
0.049 a 
(16.58) 
0.048 a 
(16.51) 
EBIT/SALES 1.707 a 
(30.64) 
1.746 a 
(28.36) 
1.738 a 
(18.01) 
1.739 a 
(17.99) 
1.973 a 
(28.10) 
1.983 a 
(28.23) 
1.717 a 
(27.92) 
1.685 a 
(17.53) 
1.689 a 
(17.54) 
1.922 a 
(27.47) 
1.937 a 
(27.66) 
CAPX/SALES 1.137 a 
(17.68) 
1.155 a 
(16.83) 
0.984 a 
(9.32) 
0.985 a 
(9.32) 
1.062 a 
(14.13) 
1.076 a 
(14.30) 
1.027 a 
(15.09) 
0.840 a 
(8.01) 
0.843 a 
(8.04) 
0.916 a 
(12.28) 
0.936 a 
(12.53) 
LEVER 0.170 a 
(7.90) 
0.233 a 
(9.78) 
0.197 a 
(5.24) 
0.189 a 
(2.99) 
0.168 a 
(6.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
0.235 a 
(9.87) 
0.186 a 
(4.92) 
0.149 a 
(2.36) 
0.169 a 
(6.27) 
-0.038 
(-0.68) 
RSZ  -0.227 a 
(-11.83) 
-0.260 a 
(-8.69) 
-0.260 a 
(-8.68) 
-0.252 a 
(-11.95) 
-0.247 a 
(-11.69) 
     
BN       -0.355 a 
(-11.10) 
-0.408 a 
(-8.50) 
-0.409 a 
(-8.51) 
-0.396 a 
(-11.45) 
0.395 a 
(-11.41) 
STD_ROA(STD_MONRET)   1.557 a 
(2.36) 
1.405 
(1.27) 
0.807 a 
(10.80) 
0.433 a 
(3.31) 
 1.145c 
(1.74) 
0.505 
(0.46) 
0.724 a 
(9.76) 
0.278b 
(2.15) 
STD_ROA(STD_MONRET)
*LEVER 
   0.596 
(0.17) 
 1.237 a 
(3.49) 
  2.513 
(0.72) 
 1.484 a 
(4.20) 
N 19,631 15,980 6,824 6,824 13,236 13,236 15,980 6,824 6,824 13,236 13,236 
R2 0.123 0.142 0.147 0.147 0.152 0.152 0.141 0.147 0.147 0.151 0.152 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level 
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Table 12 
GLM Regression Results for All Diversified Firms 
 
This table contains GLM results from regressing excess value on the number of segments, diversity, firm risk and various control variables. EXVAL is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the 
ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, RSZ is the standard 
deviation of asset-weighted segment Qs and BN is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally weighted segment Qs, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on 
assets, STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly return. Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of diversity and risk measures. Column 2 adds diversity 
measure as another control variable. Column 3 (column 5) add STD_ROA (STD_MONRET) as the risk measure. Column 4 and column 6 also include the interactive 
variable of firm risk and leverage.  
Fixed Firm Effects (RSZ) Fixed Firm Effects (BN) 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERCEPT -0.477 
(-1.33) 
-0.230 
(-0.67) 
-1.059 a 
(-5.10) 
-1.067 a 
(-5.13) 
-1.052 a 
(-5.05) 
-1.020 a 
(-4.88) 
-0.355 
(-1.04) 
-1.083 a 
(-5.20) 
-1.087 a 
(-5.21) 
-1.069 a 
(-5.12) 
-1.027 a 
(-4.90) 
NSEG  -0.023 a 
(-5.42) 
-0.033 a 
(-6.92) 
-0.042 a 
(-5.59) 
-0.042 a 
(-5.59) 
-0.042 a 
(-5.60) 
-0.042 a 
(-5.54) 
-0.019 a 
(-4.07) 
-0.025 a 
(-3.41) 
-0.025 a 
(-3.41) 
-0.025 a 
(-3.43) 
-0.025 a 
(-3.37) 
LSIZE 0.066 a 
(8.51) 
0.051 a 
(6.06) 
0.105 a 
(7.12) 
0.105 a 
(7.13) 
0.104 a 
(7.09) 
0.104 a 
(7.08) 
0.049 a 
(5.78) 
0.105 a 
(7.15) 
0.105 a 
(7.15) 
0.105 a 
(7.09) 
0.105 a 
(7.09) 
EBIT/SALES 1.617 a 
(25.04) 
1.672 a 
(23.23) 
1.743 a 
(15.57) 
1.733 a 
(15.34) 
1.745 a 
(15.62) 
1.751 a 
(15.67) 
1.620 a 
(22.53) 
1.695 a 
(15.15) 
1.690 a 
(14.96) 
1.695 a 
(15.18) 
1.704 a 
(15.26) 
CAPX/SALES 1.549 a 
(17.54) 
1.566 a 
(16.64) 
1.392 a 
(10.03) 
1.392 a 
(10.03) 
1.387 a 
(9.98) 
1.398 a 
(10.05) 
1.517 a 
(16.11) 
1.399 a 
(10.06) 
1.399 a 
(10.06) 
1.394 a 
(10.01) 
1.407 a 
(10.10) 
LEVER 0.335 a 
(11.11) 
0.428 a 
(12.94) 
0.414 a 
(7.92) 
0.447 a 
(5.96) 
0.419 a 
(7.95) 
0.309 a 
(3.77) 
0.422 a 
(12.72) 
0.400 a 
(7.62) 
0.418 a 
(5.55) 
0.404 a 
(7.66) 
0.265 a 
(3.22) 
RSZ  -0.313 a 
(-14.33) 
-0.367 a 
(-11.09) 
-0.367 a 
(-11.09) 
-0.366 a 
(-11.06) 
-0.364 a 
(-11.00) 
     
BN       -0.416 a 
(-12.77) 
-0.475 a 
(-10.18) 
-0.475 a 
(-10.17) 
-0.47 a 4 
(-10.17) 
-0.476 a 
(-10.20) 
STD_ROA(STD_MONRE
T) 
  -0.437 
(-0.57) 
0.211 
(0.16) 
-0.078 
(-0.69) 
-0.380 c 
(1.84) 
 -0.199 
(-0.26) 
0.154 
(-0.12) 
-0.085 
(-0.76) 
-0.470b 
(-2.27) 
STD_ROA(STD_MONRE
T)*LEVER 
   -2.339 
(-0.61) 
 0.908 c 
(1.74) 
  -1.274 
(0.33) 
 1.158 b 
(2.22) 
N 19,631 15,980 6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 15,980 6,824 6,824 6,824 6,824 
R2 0.685 0.712 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.711 0.752 0.752 0.752 0.752 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level 
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Table 13 
Heckman’s Regression Results for All Diversified Firms 
 
This table contains Heckman’s results from regressing excess value on the number of segments, diversity, firm risk and various control variables. EXVAL is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the 
ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, RSZ is the standard 
deviation of asset-weighted segment Qs and BN is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally weighted segment Qs, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on 
assets, STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly return. Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of diversity and risk measures. Column 2 adds diversity 
measure as another control variable. Column 3 (column 5) add STD_ROA (STD_MONRET) as the risk measure. Column 4 and column 6 also include the interactive 
variable of firm risk and leverage.  
Heckman (RSZ) Heckman (BN) 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INTERCEPT -0.555 a 
(-24.81) 
-0.550 a 
(-20.87) 
-0.553 a 
(-13.43) 
-0.557 a 
(-12.99) 
-0.622 a 
(-15.21) 
-0.573 a 
(-7.48) 
-0.606 a 
(-24.14) 
-0.601 a 
(-15.01) 
-0.598 a 
(-14.26) 
-0.675 a 
(-16.93) 
-0.617 a 
(-13.94) 
NSEG  -0.025 a 
(-6.29) 
-0.039 a 
(-8.49) 
-0.037 a 
(-5.45) 
-0.037 a 
(-5.44) 
-0.039 a 
(-5.74) 
-0.039 a 
(-3.50) 
-0.023 a 
(-5.29) 
-0.019a 
(-2.88) 
-0.019a 
(-2.89) 
-0.019 a 
(-2.96) 
-0.019 a 
(-2.98) 
LSIZE 0.050 a 
(16.91) 
0.056 a 
(17.84) 
0.059 a 
(12.60) 
0.059 a 
(12.59) 
0.063 a 
(13.53) 
0.062 a 
(7.28) 
0.055a 
(17.50) 
0.057 a 
(12.10) 
0.057 a 
(12.11) 
0.060 a 
(13.02) 
0.060 a 
(13.03) 
EBIT/SALES 1.309 a 
(25.05) 
1.366 a 
(23.51) 
1.324 a 
(15.29) 
1.322 a 
(15.25) 
1.453 a 
(16.52) 
1.460 a 
(7.80) 
1.343 a 
(23.15) 
1.271 a 
(14.73) 
1.272 a 
(14.72) 
1.392 a 
(15.89) 
1.402 a 
(16.01) 
CAPX/SALES 0.991 a 
(16.49) 
1.007a 
(15.87) 
0.992 a 
(10.82) 
0.991 a 
(10.80) 
1.012 a 
(11.10) 
1.027 a 
(5.92) 
0.899 a 
(14.25) 
0.873 a 
(9.58) 
0.874 a 
(9.58) 
0.881 a 
(9.73) 
0.900 a 
(9.92) 
LEVER 0.123 a 
(5.32) 
0.191 a 
(7.46) 
0.186 a 
(4.93) 
0.200 a 
(3.17) 
0.140 b 
(3.69) 
-0.039 
(-0.29) 
0.190 a 
(7.43) 
0.175 a 
(4.62) 
0.161a 
(2.55) 
0.133 a 
(3.49) 
-0.078 
(-0.99) 
RSZ  -0.241a 
(-11.69) 
-0.271a 
(-8.88) 
-0.271a 
(-8.88) 
-0.290a 
(-9.51) 
-0.285a 
(-5.91) 
     
BN       -0.389 a 
(-11.44) 
-0.417 a 
(-8.60) 
-0.417 a 
(-8.60) 
-0.433 a 
(-8.95) 
-0.431 a 
(-8.92) 
STD_ROA 
(STD_MONRET) 
  1.393b 
(2.07) 
1.637 
(1.47) 
0.758a 
(6.82) 
0.347 
(1.06) 
 1.027 
(1.53) 
0.792 
(0.71) 
0.692 a 
(6.26) 
0.207 
(1.07) 
STD_ROA(STD_MONRET)
*LEVER 
   -0.957 
(-0.28) 
 1.377 
(1.55) 
  0.921 
(0.27) 
 1.629 a 
(3.04) 
LAMDA 0.030 
(3.34) 
0.054 
(5.82) 
0.019 
(1.49) 
0.019 
(1.48) 
0.012 
(0.91) 
 0.042 
(4.53) 
0.008 
(0.63) 
0.008 
(0.64) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
N 17,313 14,081 6,751 6,751 6,751 6,751 14,081 6,751 6,751 6,751 6,751 
R2 0.026 0.178 0.169 0.169 0.170 0.170 0.178 0.168 0.168 0.169 0.170 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level 
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Table 14 
Regression Results for All-Equity Diversified Firms 
 
This table contains results from regressing excess value on the number of segments, diversity and various control variables for all-equity diversified firms. 
EXVAL is the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of 
total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, RSZ is the standard deviation of asset-
weighted segment Qs and BN is the asset-weighted standard deviation of equally weighted segment Qs.  Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of diversity 
measures. Column 2 and column 3 add diversity measure as another control variable. The first three columns present results from the OLS regression. The next 
three columns provide results from the fixed firm and calendar year effects. The final three columns report results from the Heckman’s two stage model.  
OLS regression Fixed effects Heckman 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.522 a 
(-6.53) 
-0.537 a 
(-4.88) 
-0.516 a 
(-5.05) 
-2.597 a 
(-3.84) 
-1.024 
(-1.05) 
-1.297 
(-1.29) 
-0.538 a 
(-6.38) 
-0.578 a 
(-4.87) 
-0.553 a 
(-5.08) 
NSEG  -0.081 a 
(-3.70) 
-0.089 a 
(-3.20) 
-0.084 a 
(-3.14) 
-0.61 
(-1.50) 
-0.176 a 
(-2.77) 
-0.092 
(-1.44) 
-0.078 a 
(-3.39) 
-0.080 a 
(-2.67) 
-0.073 b 
(-2.54) 
LSIZE 0.094 a 
(6.75) 
0.095 a 
(5.56) 
0.092 a 
(5.45) 
0.320 a 
(5.51) 
0.221 b 
(2.26) 
0.185 c 
(1.83) 
0.104 a 
(6.96) 
0.105 a 
(5.63) 
0.100 a 
(5.44) 
EBIT/SALES 1.595 a 
(8.04) 
1.599 a 
(6.13) 
1.616 a 
(6.22) 
1.573 a 
(5.96) 
1.961 a 
(5.03) 
1.660 a 
(4.15) 
1.658a 
(7.96) 
1.587 a 
(5.71) 
1.634 a 
(5.91) 
CAPX/SALES 1.546 a 
(5.14) 
1.704 a 
(4.66) 
1.667 a 
(4.58) 
-0.764 
(-1.61) 
0.120 
(-0.19) 
-0.120 
(-0.19) 
1.683a 
(5.40) 
1.767 a 
(4.64) 
1.695 a 
(4.48) 
RSZ  -0.080 
(-0.96) 
  -0.800 a 
(-5.46) 
  -0.097 
(-1.12) 
 
BN   -0.417b 
(-2.86) 
  -0.382 c 
(-1.71) 
  -0.524b 
(-3.49) 
LAMBDA       -0.059b 
(-2.22) 
-0.027 
(-0.80) 
-0.018 
(-0.56) 
N 1,363 785 785 1,363 785 785 1,266 728 728 
R2 0.120 0.132 0.140 0.792 0.839 0.827 0.022 0.345 0.347 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 15 
Regression Results for Pseudo Conglomerate Firms 
 
This table contains results from regressing excess value on the number of segments, firm risk and various control variables. EXVAL is the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual 
value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total sales, 
CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, LEVER is the ratio of interest bearing debt to total assets, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on assets, 
STD_MONRET is the standard deviation of monthly returns. Column 1 gives results without the inclusion of risk measures. Column 2 (column 4) add STD_ROA 
(STD_MONRET) as the risk measure. Column 3 and column 5 also include the interactive variable of firm risk and leverage. The first five columns present results from the 
OLS regression. The next five columns provide results from the fixed firm and calendar year effects.  The final five columns report results from Heckman’s two stage model.  
OLS regression Fixed effects Heckman 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept -0.438 a 
(-8.69) 
-0.388 a 
(-3.54) 
-0.392 a 
(-3.45) 
-0.528 a 
(-7.42) 
-0.523 a 
(-6.35) 
-1.434 a 
(-5.02) 
-1.638 a 
(-3.09) 
-1.706 a 
(-3.22) 
-1.485 a 
(-2.78) 
-1.391 a 
(-2.60) 
-0.442 a 
(-7.97) 
-0.320a 
(-2.81) 
-0.320a 
(-2.71) 
-0.377 a 
(-3.36) 
-0.350a 
(-2.66) 
NSEG  -0.046 a 
(-3.71) 
-0.048 c 
(-1.87) 
-0.048 c 
(-1.87) 
-0.042 a 
(-2.91) 
-0.04 2a 
(-2.91) 
-0.068 a 
(-3.49) 
-0.091 
(-1.69) 
-0.094 c 
(-1.75) 
-0.080 
(-1.50) 
-0.083 
(-1.54) 
-0.041a 
(-3.12) 
-0.046c 
(-1.78) 
-0.046c 
(-1.78) 
-0.048c 
(-1.84) 
-0.048c 
(-1.84) 
LSIZE 0.042 a 
(5.21) 
0.036 b 
(2.51) 
0.036 a 
(2.50) 
0.051 a 
(5.44) 
0.051 a 
(5.43) 
0.128 a 
(4.09) 
0.180 a 
(2.79) 
0.178 a 
(2.76) 
0.183 a 
(2.84) 
0.184 a 
(2.86) 
0.047 a 
(5.44) 
0.038a 
(2.60) 
0.038b 
(2.59) 
0.041a 
(2.83) 
0.041a 
(2.81) 
EBIT/SALES 1.432 a 
(9.29) 
1.979 a 
(6.90) 
1.977 a 
(6.88) 
1.592 a 
(8.72) 
1.593 a 
(8.72) 
1.358 a 
(6.90) 
1.506 a 
(3.97) 
1.448 a 
(3.81) 
1.421 a 
(3.76) 
1.425 a 
(3.78) 
1.420 a 
(8.68) 
1.988 a 
(6.86) 
1.988 a 
(6.84) 
2.056a 
(6.95) 
2.057 a 
(6.95) 
CAPX/SALES 1.518 a 
(8.03) 
1.098 a 
(3.33) 
1.096 a 
(3.32) 
1.513 a 
(6.98) 
1.514 a 
(6.98) 
1.429 a 
(4.83) 
0.606 
(1.11) 
0.547 
(1.00) 
0.656 
(1.20) 
0.702 
(1.29) 
1.555 a 
(7.66) 
1.097 a 
(3.32) 
1.098 a 
(3.32) 
1.080 a 
(3.26) 
1.088 a 
(3.28) 
LEVER 0.064 
(0.98) 
-0.006 
(-0.05) 
0.014 
(0.07) 
-0.021 
(-0.28) 
-0.038 
(-0.22) 
0.053 
(0.44) 
0.184 
(0.80) 
0.588 c 
(1.83) 
0.187 
(0.82) 
-0.158 
(-0.50) 
-0.012 
(-0.17) 
-0.006 
(-0.05) 
-0.008 
(-0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-0.095 
(-0.35) 
STD_ROA(MON
RET) 
 0.035 
(0.02) 
0.257 
(0.10) 
0.315 c 
(1.65) 
0.289 
(0.96) 
 5.398 b 
(2.09) 
11.709a 
(2.67) 
-0.689 b 
(-2.17) 
-1.414 b 
(-2.55) 
 -0.359 
(-0.19) 
-0.379 
(-0.15) 
0.207 
(0.70) 
0.057 
(0.12) 
STD_ROA(MON
RET)*LEVER 
  -1.127 
(-0.12) 
 0.101 
(0.11) 
  -23.170c 
(1.78) 
 2.418 
(1.59) 
  0.105 
(0.01) 
 0.568 
(0.39) 
LAMBDA           -0.017 
(-0.79) 
-0.068b 
(-2.10) 
-0.068b 
(-2.10) 
-0.065b 
(-1.99) 
-0.066b 
(-2.02) 
N 2,451 811 811 1,916 1,916 2,451 811 811 811 811 2,196 795 795 795 795 
R2 0.109 0.121 0.121 0.117 0.117 0.798 0.845 0.846 0.846 0.846 0.020 0.021 0.021 0.022 0.022 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
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Table 16 
Regression Results for Change in Excess Value around Diversification 
 
This table contains results from regressing change in excess value on various control variables. EXVAL is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. NSEG is the number of business 
segments a firm has, LSIZE is the natural log of total assets, EBIT/SALES is the ratio of EBIT to total 
sales, CAPX/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales, LEVER is the ratio of interest 
bearing debt to total assets, STD_ROA is the standard deviation of return on assets, STD_MONRET is the 
standard deviation of monthly returns, and RMSE is the standard deviation of the residuals from the single 
factor market model based on weekly returns. Column 1 gives results using STD_ROA as the risk measure. 
Column 2 and column 3 use STD_MONRET or RMSE as the risk measure.   
 
Risk Increase Risk Decrease 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept -0.036 
(-0.25) 
0.057 
(0.82) 
0.005 
(0.07) 
-0.126 
(-0.91) 
-0.168b 
(-2.17) 
-0.116 
(-1.40) 
LSIZE -0.026 
(-1.00) 
-0.025b 
(-1.99) 
-0.020c 
(-1.73) 
-0.020 
(-0.78) 
0.016 
(1.16) 
0.018 
(1.22) 
EBIT 0.215 
(0.55) 
0.218c 
(1.91) 
0.260b 
(2.32) 
0.348 
(0.87) 
0.045 
(0.28) 
-0.063 
(-0.38) 
CAPX -0.402 
(-1.56) 
0.011 
(0.10) 
-0.053 
(-0.61) 
1.063 
(1.57) 
-0.187c 
(-1.76) 
-0.269 
(-1.47) 
LEVER 0.171 
(0.75) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
0.038 
(0.39) 
0.258 
(1.13) 
0.088 
(0.75) 
0.013 
(0.11) 
N 178 615 634 174 470 451 
R2 0.027 0.011 0.012 0.027 0.011 0.007 
a: Significant at 1% level. b: Significant at 5% level. c: Significant at 10% level. 
 
   
 
